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III. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This reply brief is argued in response to issues raised 
by Memorial Estates.1 Point I shows that the class decertification 
order has not received appellate review. Point II shows that the 
case or controversy at issue on appeal is the class decertification 
order. Point III shows that Schoney did not waive the right to 
appeal the class decertification. Point IV shows that Schoney has 
standing to represent the class to appeal the decertification 
order. Point V shows that due process requires notice to the 
putative class if Schoney is not allowed to appeal decertification. 
Point VI shows that Memorial Estates concedes the erroneous nature 
of the decertification order. Point VII discusses the 
inappropriateness of sanctions against Schoneyfs counsel. 
1
 The Utah Rule 23 governing class actions is identical to Fed. 
R. Civ. Proc. 23. In the absence of contrary state rulings, Utah 
courts frequently follow the reasoning of federal courts 
interpreting identical or comparable rules. Wilson v. Lambert, 613 
P.2d 765 (Utah 1980). Thus, most of the discussion below will 
focus on cases discussing the federal rule which is identical to 
the Utah rule. 
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IV. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT DECIDE 
THE ISSUE OF CLASS DECERTIFICATION 
A* Procedural Setting 
In 1983, Judge Fishier certified the underlying case as 
a class action. Schoney was appointed class representative. App. 
Ex. B. The order expressly stated that the class was certified 
under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure "[i]n 
order to give res judicata effect to the entire class." Id. at 3. 
No notice of the certification was given to the class members. 
In 1985, Judge Dee decertified the class. Again, the 
court did not provide notice of the decertification to the class. 
See generally statement of facts in Brief of Appellant. 
Thus, a "live" issue in the case was and is whether or 
not Judge Dee's decertification order was correct. Judge Dee's 
ruling directly affected each putative class member. However, 
because Judge Dee's decertification order was interlocutory, the 
plaintiffs had no right to appeal that order until a subsequent 
final judgment was entered. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 
U.S. 463, 57 L.Ed. 2d 351, 98 S.Ct. 2454 (1978). When Judge Moffat 
entered a final judgment (Ex. E of Appellee's Brief), all class 
issues, including Judge Dee's decertification order, became ripe 
for appeal. 
2 
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B. Analysis 
Schoneyfs opening brief argues that the Court of Appeals 
only ruled on the discovery sanction against Schoney individually, 
and that the Court of Appeals never reached or decided the 
correctness of Judge Dee's decertification order. See Brief of 
Appellant, Point III. 
Memorial Estates offers contradictory arguments as to 
whether or not the class issue received appellate review in Schoney 
v. Memorial Estates ("Schoney I"), 790 P.2d 584 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). Brief of Appellant, App. Ex. F. First, Memorial Estates 
argues that the ruling pertained only to Schoney: 
Only the actual parties in this case—George 
and Erma Schoney, Memorial Estates, Inc., et 
al., and their respective successors in 
interest—are bound by the result and 
dismissal of this case. The plain and simple 
fact in this case is that no one else is bound 
by this judgment. 
* * * 
Suffice it to say that, except for the 
plaintiffs' [sic] Schoney, other putative 
class members retain their own rights and 
claims, if any. 
Appellee's Brief at 22-24. 
Schoney wholeheartedly agrees. The discovery sanction 
was against Schoney only. Thus, only Schoney was dismissed from 
the case. All other class members retain whatever rights they may 
have. This admission by Memorial Estates negates any issue between 
the parties as to the extent of the ruling in Schoney I. See 
3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Fletcher v. Eagle River Memorial Hosp.. Inc.. 456 N.W.2d 788 (Wis. 
1990) (discussing the effect of judicial admissions). 
In the alternative, Memorial Estates argues: "Plaintiff 
has already had her appeal and determination of issues litigated. 
. . . The final judgment disposing of all claims and parties was 
affirmed." Appellee's Brief at 17-18. However, the specific 
language of the Schonev I shows that this Court did not rule on the 
correctness of Judge Dee's decertification order. The opinion 
plainly states that the ruling is limited to the narrow issue of 
whether the trial court erred in granting a default judgment 
against Schoney as a discovery sanction: "We affirm as to the 
default judgment and accordingly have no need to consider the 
propriety of the summary judgment." Schoney I at 584. See Brief 
of Appellant, App. Ex. F. This Court expressly stated that the 
ruling did not go beyond the narrow issue addressed in the opinion. 
Moreover, the precise question of whether a ruling on 
decertification can be inferred from the appellate court's silence 
on the issue was recently addressed in American Tierra Corp. v. 
Citv of West Jordan. 186 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1992). In that 
case, the class was originally certified, and later decertified. 
The Utah Supreme Court ruled that appellate review of the trial 
court's class certification order cannot be inferred from the 
opinion's silence on the issue. Jd. at 7 n.4. 
4 
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American Tierra resolves the precise question at issue in 
this appeal. This Court1s ruling on the discovery sanction against 
Schoney did not address the class decertification order. The Court 
was silent on the issue of class certification. Under American 
Tierra, appellate review of the class certification issue cannot be 
inferred from the court's silence. Thus, the class decertification 
issue in this case has not yet received appellate review. The 
putative class is entitled to appellate review of the decertifi-
cation order. 
POINT II 
THE CASE OR CONTROVERSY IN THIS CASE 
IS THE DECERTIFICATION ORDER 
Memorial Estates asserts: "Suffice it to say that, 
except for the plaintiffs' [sic] Schoney, other putative class 
members retain their own rights and claims, if any." Appellee's 
Brief at 24. One of the important "rights" which the class members 
had was to have the case proceed as a class action. Although Judge 
Dee decertified the class, class members still had a "right" to 
have that ruling reviewed by an appellate court. This case arises 
precisely because an important "right" has been taken away from the 
class members. Specifically, Judge Moffat's ruling (Ex. C to 
Appellee's Brief) has taken away any "right" to have this case 
proceed as a class action. That loss is the controversy at issue. 
The basic shortcoming of Memorial Estates' argument is 
its assumption that Constitutional concepts work the same way in a 
5 
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class context as in a traditional type of suit. Memorial Estates 
mistakenly asserts: "There was, and is, no case or controversy 
before this Court or the trial court. Absent a pending case and 
controversy, plaintiff cannot show that she is an 'aggrieved party1 
to the appeal." Appelleefs Brief at p. 15. 
Contrary to Memorial Estates' assertions, this appeal has 
nothing to do with the final ruling on Schoney's individual case. 
Since the rulings in Mrs. Schoney's case did not go to the merits 
of the class issues, the disposition of Schoney's individual case 
is nondispositive of the putative class claim. This appeal is 
limited to the order decertifying the class. App. Ex. C. See also 
Brief of Appellant, App. Ex. C and D. 
The primary "case or controversy" at issue before this 
Court is the right of the putative class to appeal decertification. 
This is a separate question from the disposition of an individual 
plaintiff's separate action on a related claim: 
A plaintiff who brings a class action presents 
two separate questions, namely the claim on 
the merits and the claim of entitlement to 
represent the class. Because "the denial of 
class certification stands as an adjudication 
of one of the issues litigated," [footnote 
omitted], the plaintiff may continue to press 
the class certification claim after the claim 
on the merits terminates, when the plaintiff . 
. . continues to advocate vigorously the right 
to have a class certified. 
2 Newberg on Class Actions § 2.31 at 113-14 (1985)(quoting Deposit 
Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 336 (1980)). 
6 
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Although the putative class claim is separate from the 
named plaintiff!s claim when the plaintiff proceeds individually, 
appeal of the decertification must await final resolution of the 
individual plaintiff's claim. Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper. 
445 U.S. 324, 337 ("We view the denial of class certification as an 
example of a procedural ruling, collateral to the merits of a liti-
gation, that is appealable after the entry of final judgment."). 
This is because a decertification order is interlocutory and is 
generally not immediately appealable.2 During the interlocutory 
period, the putative class members "remain parties until a final 
determination has been made that the action may not be maintained 
as a class action." Id., 342 (1980) (J. Stevens, concurring). 
Only after a final judgment is entered can the decertification 
order be appealed. See, e.g., Coopers & Lvbrand v. Livesay, 437 
U.S. 463, 467 (1977) ("An order denying class certification is 
subject to effective review after final judgment at the behest of 
the named plaintiff or intervening class members."). 
The Roper Court further noted: "[A] decision that is 
•final1 for purposes of appeal does not absolutely resolve a case 
or controversy until the time for appeal has run." Roper, supra. 
2The Supreme Court noted in Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank v. 
Roper that interlocutory appeal for review of certification rulings 
might be appropriate in certain circumstances, but not as a matter 
of right. 445 U.S. 324, 338 n.8. (1980). In the instant case, no 
discretionary interlocutory appeal of the decertification was 
taken. 
7 
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at 334. Thus, either an appeal of the certification issue or the 
running of the time for appeal must occur before the issue of class 
certification is finally and fully resolved.3 
In summary, the case or controversy requirement of 
article III of the U.S. Constitution is satisfied as long as a live 
controversy concerns the class, and regardless of whether the 
representative's individual claims have been settled, mooted, or 
dismissed. See, e.g., United States Parole Comm'n v. Geracrhty, 445 
U.S. 338 (1980) (holding that an action brought on behalf of a 
class does not become moot upon expiration of the named plaintiff's 
substantive claim, even though class certification has been 
denied). The decertification controversy here presented is viable. 
POINT III 
SCHONEY HAS STANDING TO APPEAL DECERTIFICATION ORDER 
Memorial Estates suggests that Schoney is seeking "to 
pursue her personal claims on behalf of a putative call [sic] when 
all of her claims, including the class issues, either [sic] have 
been already fully and finally decided against her after appellate 
3Counsel notes that any applicable statute of limitations is 
tolled pending resolution of the class certification issue. See 
American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah. 414 U.S. 538 (1973)(holding 
that commencement of a class action tolls the applicable statute of 
limitations as to all class members). See also American Tierra 
Corp. v. City of West Jordan, 186 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 at 5-6 (Utah 
1992)(holding that the statute of limitations for putative class 
claims is tolled during the interlocutory period and throughout the 
appeal on the certification issue). 
8 
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review." Appellee's Brief at 16-17. This statement misconstrues 
the purpose of Schoney's presence before this Court. 
In the instant case, Schoney's individual claims were 
finally resolved under a default judgment. However, the class 
claims were not encompassed in the ruling since Schoney's case had 
been previously severed from the putative class claim. Brief of 
Appellant, App. Ex. C. Moreover, the ruling in Schonev I did not 
reach the merits, since the case ended with a default judgment. 
Id., App. Ex. F. Thus, the question of whether the putative class 
claim is a live case or controversy has not been decided and is 
properly before this Court. 
The standing or personal stake requirement for the class 
representative differs from that of the traditional plaintiff. 
This simply results from the fact that: "The class action device 
was designed as 'an exception to the usual rule that litigation is 
conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.'" 
General Tel. Co. of the S.W. v. Falcon. 457 U.S. 147, 155 (1982). 
A "personal stake" in the litigation is required to 
ensure that the case involves "sharply presented issues in a 
concrete factual setting and self-interested parties vigorously 
advocating opposing positions." Zeidman v. J. Ray McDermott & Co. , 
651 F.2d 1030, 1042 (5th Cir. 1981). As a class action involves an 
entire group of individual members, the personal stake requirement 
differs in that context. The personal stake requirement functions 
9 
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in that arena primarily as a test for ensuring adequate repre-
sentation of class claims. 
The test for a personal stake in a class decertification 
appeal has two elements. The first element uses the relation-back 
doctrine to "examine the named plaintiff's personal stake at the 
time the district court denied the motion for class certification." 
Rocky v. King, 900 F.2d 864, 868 (5th Cir. 1990). This element is 
particularly important where the claim is inherently transitory in 
nature and will expire with the passing of time. Swisher v. Brady. 
438 U.S. 204 (1978); Gerstein v. Pucrh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). The 
requirement is met if the plaintiff had a personal stake in the 
claim at the time of decertification. 
Schoney satisfies this element since she was the named 
plaintiff of the class until it was decertified. App. Ex. B. 
Moreover, she has had a continuing personal stake in the related 
litigation pursued since class decertification. The relation-back 
doctrine thus pertains to the putative class in this litigation. 
Although the putative class claims are still viable, there can be 
no more entrants into the plaintiff class since Memorial Estates1 
pre-need program has ended and all class claims will expire with 
the passing of time. 
The second element requires that the plaintiff will 
continue to adequately represent the class on appeal. "So long as 
the named plaintiff continues vigorously to advocate the right to 
10 
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certify a class, the named plaintiff retains a sufficient personal 
stake in posing such a procedural challenge." Rocky v. King, 
supra, at 868 (citing United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraqhty, 445 
U.S. 388 (1980)). 
As Geraahtv explains, this aspect of the personal stake 
requirement in the class context often relates more to the efforts 
of counsel than the named plaintiff. The analysis used is "more 
analogous to the private attorney concept than to the type of 
interest traditionally thought to satisfy the 'personal stake1 
requirement." 445 U.S. at 403. See also Sosna v. Iowa. 419 U.S. 
393, 403 (1975) (stating that mootness of the named plaintiff's 
claim shifts the "focus of examination from the elements of 
justiciability to the ability of the named representative to 
•fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class'"). See 
generally Yeazell, Collective Litigation as Collective Action. 1989 
U. 111. L. Rev. 43 at 54 (discussing private attorney concept of 
class actions). 
This aspect of the personal stake requirement has been 
expressed as a fiduciary duty imposed on counsel, or on the named 
plaintiff, to adequately represent the class interests in 
litigation. Soskel v. Texaco. Inc., 94 F.R.D. 201 (DC N.Y. 1982). 
Thus, the courts will examine "whether plaintiffs' counsel 
continues to pursue the class's interest in a competent, vigorous 
manner." Wilder v. BernsteinP 645 F. Supp. 1292, 1313 (S.D.N.Y. 
11 
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1986) (citing Sosna v. Iowa, supra. 419 U.S. at 403). Schoney's 
ten-year involvement with the case and ongoing attempts to appeal 
the class decertification provide ample evidence of vigorous, 
continuing advocacy of the class interests. See Record Index, App. 
Ex. C. 
Prudential considerations support letting the original 
named plaintiff appeal the class decertification when the personal 
stake requirement is met, even if the plaintiff lacks a continuing 
interest in the traditional sense: 
Geraahtv dealt with the ability of a class 
plaintiff with a moot claim to appeal the 
denial of class certification, and courts may 
choose to interpret its holding narrowly, 
though a more prudential construction would 
support the argument that, given the existence 
of a live controversy and the availability of 
substitution during all stages of litigation, 
absence of a personal stake through mootness 
of the representative's claims should not 
render the action moot on behalf of the class. 
An existing class representative should be 
permitted to continue, even if only on an 
interim basis pending appeal or until there 
has been an opportunity for a substitute class 
member with a live claim to intervene. The 
continued pursuit of litigation by a plaintiff 
who survived initial scrutiny for standing 
presumes vigorousness of prosecution [footnote 
omitted] and may not be much different from 
the plaintiff who forgoes a larger monetary 
recovery to bring a class action for lower 
statutory damages. The motive of the latter 
plaintiff may not be challenged. 
Newbera on Class Actions § 2.33 at 123-24. 
The courts have been willing to expand the boundaries of 
the personal stake requirement to facilitate appeals of class 
12 
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certification orders. The Supreme Court set the example by ruling 
that a plaintiff's economic interest in shifting litigation costs 
to other putative class members conferred a sufficient personal 
stake to justify that plaintiffs representing the class upon appeal 
of the decertification order. Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 
445 U.S. 326, 337 (1980). 
Rule 23 does not require that the plaintiff be identi-
cally situated with the rest of the class in order to represent the 
class on appeal. The commonality requirement: 
does not require that all questions of law or 
fact raised by the dispute be common; nor does 
it establish any quantitative or qualitative 
test of commonality. All that can be divined 
from the rule itself is that the use of the 
plural "questions" suggests that more than one 
issue of law or fact must be common to the 
class. 
7 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1763 
(1969). Under Rule 23, the personal stake requirement focuses more 
on the plaintiff's ability to protect the interests of the class 
than on the plaintiff's "representativeness" of class members. 
Schoney "will fairly and adequately protect the interests 
of the class" for appealing the decertification order. Utah R. 
Civ. P. 23(a). She has an adequate personal stake in the claim to 
appeal the class decertification. Her demonstrated long-term 
commitment to the case and to protecting the putative class 
interests demonstrate that she meets the personal stake requirement 
for class actions. 
13 
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POINT IV 
SCHONEY DID NOT WAIVE ANY CLASS CLAIMS 
Memorial Estates argues that Schoney waived her right to 
challenge Judge Dee's decertification order. 
[P]laintiff failed to properly preserve the 
issue before the Court of Appeals [during 
Schonev II when her 39-page [sic] Appellant's 
Brief failed to discuss any of the arguments 
that she makes today.-- Failure to raise the 
issue in the Appellant's Brief and to support 
that argument with cogent legal authority 
fails to preserve the issue for appellate 
review. The decertification issue was waived. 
Appellees' Brief at 19-20. 
The only reason there was no discussion of the class 
decertification issue in Schoneys' brief was because this Court 
entered an order prohibiting the Schoneys from enlarging their 
brief to address the issue. Schoney responded to the order by 
filing a petition for writ of mandamus with the Utah Supreme Court. 
The petition for mandamus specifically argued that the Schoneys 
were wrongfully prevented from enlarging their brief to include 
arguments regarding Judge Dee's decertification order. See App. 
Ex. D. 
The petition for mandamus was ultimately denied. At oral 
argument, however, Justice Zimmerman said that the Schoneys were 
still free to raise the issue of Judge Dee's decertification order 
at oral argument before the Court of Appeals. 
14 
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Mr. Wells: . . . the court has ruled later 
that we failed to brief, and therefore waived 
[the right to appeal the decertification 
order.] That is a judgment of the court, 
which it affects the whole class under Rule 23 
of the dismissal of class, [sic] 
The Court: Have they entered an order saying 
you've waived it? 
Mr. Wells: By refusing to allow the brief to 
be filed, the issue was not raised on the 
appeal. 
The Court: Did you raise it in your docketing 
statement? 
Mr. Wells: It was raised in the docket. 
The Court: You can argue it at oral argument 
presumably, can't you? 
* * • 
The Court: You still have oral argument. You 
had a docketing statement, so you can still 
argue it, which means that everything is 
presently sort of in coed [sic] down there. 
Oral Arguments from Electronic Tapes at 4, 6 (App. Ex. E). 
Schoney's followed Justice Zimmerman's instructions. The 
issue of class decertification was argued at length during oral 
argument before this Court. See Transcript of Electronic Tapes at 
14 and 21-24, Case No. 880630-CA, Court of Appeals (1990) (App. Ex. 
F). Those oral arguments were received without objection. 
In summary, Schoney never waived the issue. It was 
presented to this Court. However, the Court of Appeals never ruled 
on or addressed this issue. See Point I of this Brief. 
15 
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POINT V 
DUE PROCESS REQUIRES THAT PUTATIVE CLASS RECEIVE NOTICE 
OR THAT SCHONEY BE ALLOWED TO APPEAL DECERTIFICATION 
Class actions are entitled to special due process 
considerations because "a judgment in a class action may bind 
members of the class who did not receive the kind of notice and 
opportunity to be heard as would be required to render them 
•parties1 in the traditional sense, provided that their interests 
were adequately represented." Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. 
Co. , 770 F. Supp. 1499, 1544 (N.D. Ala. 1991) (citing Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 808 (1985); Hansberry v. 
Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); and H. Newberg, 3 Newbera on Class Actions 
§ 13.41 at 81-82 (1985)). 
Contrary to Memorial Estates1 assertion that Schoney has 
waived Constitutional issues, Constitutional protections cannot be 
waived absent clear and compelling circumstances. Appellee's Brief 
at 28. See Curtis Publ. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
Rather, Schoney has now raised a due process issue because it has 
now arisen as a result of the District Court's denial of the 
putative class's right to appeal decertification. See Minute 
Entry, Brief of Appellant, App. Ex. G. 
The Supreme Court has "observed that notice and an 
opportunity to be heard [are] fundamental requisites of the 
constitutional guarantee of procedural due process." Eisen v. 
Carlisle. 417 U.S. 156, 174 (1973)(citing Mullane v. Central 
16 
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Hanover Bank & Trust Co,, 339 U.S. 306 (1950)). This notice, the 
Court stated, must be "reasonably calculated, under the 
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the 
action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." 
Mullane, supra at 314. The Eisen Court further concluded that: 
individual notice to identifiable class 
members is not a discretionary consideration 
to be waived in a particular case. It is, 
rather, an unambiguous requirement of Rule 23. 
As the Advisory Committee's Note explained, 
the Rule was intended to insure that the 
judgment, whether favorable or not, would bind 
all class members who did not request 
exclusion from the suit. 28 U.S.C. App. pp. 
7765, 7768. 
Eisen, supra at 176. The Court explained that "Rule 23 speaks to 
notice as well as to adequacy of representation and requires that 
both be provided." Id. 
This Court has recently emphasized the importance of 
notice in class actions: 
Notice to absent members of a plaintiff class, 
and an opportunity for them to disassociate 
themselves from the class, are critical 
requirements for maintenance of a class 
action, requirements founded in the federally 
guaranteed right of the absent class members 
to due process of law. [citations omitted] A 
class action adjudicates the rights of persons 
who ordinarily are not actively involved in 
the litigation or aware of specific actions 
taken in it. Because of this fact, the court 
assumes some responsibility to protect the 
interests of the absent class members. 
Workman v. Naale Constr., Inc., 802 P.2d 749 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
(citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts. 742 U.S. 797 (1985); In 
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re Temple, 841 F.2d 1269 (11th Cir. 1988); and Wehner v. Svntex 
Corp,, 117 F.R.D. 641, 645 (N.D. Cal. 1987)). 
Due process generally requires that notice and an 
opportunity to be heard must be given to any party whose liberty or 
property interests may be adversely affected by legal proceedings. 
Tulsa Professional Collection Serv. v. Pope. 485 U.S. 478 (1988) 
(citing U.S. Const, amend. V). This requirement is stressed by the 
open courts provision of the Utah Constitution. Utah Const, art. 
1, § 11. The requirement for notice and an opportunity to be heard 
also underlies Rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
which grants a party the right to intervene "when an applicant's 
claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact 
in common." This rule recognizes the right of persons to become 
involved in litigation affecting them. 
The damages to the putative class include property 
interests. The claim involves relatively modest levels of monetary 
damages incurred by a considerable number of individuals. The 
limited monetary value of individual damages incurred effectively 
preclude the putative class members from litigating their claims 
separately. The decertification order thus operates, in effect, as 
a de facto ruling against the members' opportunity to litigate 
their claims. 
Memorial Estates misleadingly suggests that individual 
class members are still free to litigate their claims. Although 
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their claims may be viable, their ability to litigate these claims 
is limited by monetary constraints. The limited damages which each 
individual can recover limits the feasibility of separate legal 
challenges. Thus, a class action is suitable to protect their 
interests. See Calif ano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 701 
(1979)(noting that the fact that each separate claim has little 
monetary value is a factor favoring class treatment). 
The claim on its face presents a typical class setting, 
involving "the often subtle operation of classwide injuries, the 
sophistication of corporate defendants, and the victimization of 
small claimants." 2 Newbera on Class Actions § 2.33 at 122 (1985). 
The putative class is primarily composed of elderly persons, a 
category of citizens which are too often victimized in unscrupulous 
dealings. They are prime targets for the kinds of schemes for 
which class actions provide an ideal means of redress. 
Furthermore, many individual claimants are unable to 
pursue their claims except as a class due to the applicable statute 
of limitations. Whereas the statute is tolled pending final 
determination of the class status, many individual claimants, if 
the right to appeal the class determination is not recognized, are 
unable to proceed. They will be denied due process because certain 
class members may have been awaiting a final order before appealing 
the class decertification. 
19 
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The notice requirements under Rule 23 have been limited 
by the courts in certain circumstances. Memorial Estates has 
briefed this point quite trenchantly. Appellee's Brief, Point II. 
However, the limitations which some cases impose on Rule 23 notice 
provisions do not limit the courts' duty to ensure basic due 
process. 
Memorial Estates' recitation of cases limiting Rule 23 
notice requirements erroneously suggests that they govern this 
case. For example, Memorial Estates quotes Larenzano v. Texaco, 
Inc., 14 F.R. Serv.2d 679 (S.D. N.Y. 1971). The quoted language 
pertains only to cases where "it has been clearly demonstrated that 
the action is without merit and should be dismissed for failure to 
state a claim." Quoted in Appellee's Brief at 27. Although 
Schoney's individual claim was dismissed, her claim had been 
severed from the class claim. Further, since Schoney I reached 
only the discovery sanction, it did not reach the merits of the 
underlying claim. The reasoning of Larenzano does not apply to 
this case because merits of the class claim have neither been 
considered nor dismissed. 
In summary, due process requires either that Schoney be 
allowed to appeal the decertification order, or that notice be 
given to the putative class to permit a substitute class repre-
sentative to come forward to appeal the decertification order. If 
this Court denies to class members these protections, the putative 
20 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
class will be effectively denied its day in court. Such a denial 
violates due process guarantees. 
POINT VI 
MEMORIAL ESTATES CONCEDES THAT JUDGE DEE 
ERRED BY DECERTIFYING THE CLASS 
This case really presents a two-step analysis. Step one 
is to determine whether Judge Dee's decertification order is now 
ripe for appellate review. See Brief of Appellant, Points I, II 
and III. Step two is to actually review Judge Dee's decertifi-
cation order. See id., Point IV. 
Memorial Estates has devoted its entire brief to a 
challenge of step one. That is, Memorial Estates argues, exclu-
sively, that Judge Dee's decertification order should not be 
reviewed. However, Memorial Estates has said nothing at all about 
step two. Nowhere does Memorial Estates argue that Judge Dee acted 
correctly by decertifying the class. Specifically, Memorial 
Estates has not responded to Point IV of the Brief of Appellant. 
By failing to respond to step two, Memorial Estates has 
essentially admitted the point. Generally, a party's failure to 
address debatable issues in an answering brief constitutes a 
confession of reversible error. A confession of reversible error 
takes its most extreme form when an appellee fails to file a 
responsive brief. Harrison v. Harrison. 462 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah 
1969). On a lesser scale, a confession as to a particular point 
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results from an appellees' failure to address debatable issues in 
the brief. "Arguments not fully developed on appeal are deemed 
waived." Lilley v. Johns-Manville Corp., 596 A. 2d 203, 207 n.2 
(Pa. Super. 1991)(citing Cosner v. United Penn. Bank, 517 A.2d 1337 
(1986)). 
Thus, Memorial Estates, though arguing that Schoney has 
no right to appeal the decertification, apparently concedes that 
the decertification was improper. Memorial Estates offered no 
statement of law or fact to counter Schoney fs arguments that the 
decertification order was erroneous. Memorial Estates therefore 
must be deemed to agree with Schoney that the order was wrong. 
POINT VII 
SANCTIONS AGAINST SCHONEY SHOULD BE REVERSED 
As the foregoing analysis amply demonstrates, Schoney has 
a valid basis for appealing the class decertification. Her counsel 
also has a fiduciary duty to protect the interests of the class. 
Soskel v. Texaco, Inc., 94 F.R.D. 201 (D.C. N.Y. 1982). The trial 
court apparently misunderstood the basis of Schoney^s attempts to 
appeal the class decertification when it imposed Rule 11 sanctions 
upon Schoney's counsel. Incredibly, Memorial Estates seeks further 
sanctions imposed, and asks this Court to uphold tfce trial court's 
conduct. Appellee's Brief, Point III. 
While the procedural and Constitutional issues presented 
by this appeal may be complicated, they do not lack a genuine legal 
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or factual basis. Memorial Estates1 applause of the trial court's 
sanctions and request for further sanctions is itself a meritless 
position. 
This Court should uphold the rights of the class to 
appeal the decertification order. This Court should deny further 
sanctions against Schoney and her counsel. As this Court recently 
admonished: "The 'sanction' for bringing a frivolous appeal is 
applied only in egregious cases, 'lest there be an improper 
chilling of the right to appeal erroneous lower court rulings.1" 
Mauqhan v. Mauqhan, 770 P.2d 156, 162 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (quoting 
Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)). 
The instant case involves a valid right of appeal and 
certainly does not fit the model of egregious violations which 
would warrant further sanctions. This Court should reverse the 
trial court's impositions of Rule 11 sanctions against Schoney's 
counsel. Only thus can the right of the putative class to appeal 
the decertification order be protected. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
The putative class has a right to appeal the decertifi-
cation order. That order has not yet received appellate review. 
Either Schoney or another class representative should be 
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allowed the opportunity to appeal decertification on behalf of the 
class. Otherwise, the putative class will be denied due process of 
law. 
DATED this K) day of Lt/nr~ 1992, 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
ROBERT J. DEBRY, 
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Art II, § 2 CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 444 
be increased nor diminished during the Period for 
which he shall have been elected, and he shall not 
receive within the Period any other Emolument from 
the United States, or any of them. 
[8.] Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, 
he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation: — "I 
do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully 
execute the Office of President of the United States, 
and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect 
and defend the Constitution of the United States." 
Sec. 2. [Commander-in-Chief — Pardons — 
Treaties — Appointment of officers.] 
[1.] The President shall be Commander in Chief of 
the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the 
Militia of the several States, when called into the 
actual Service of the United States; he may require 
the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in 
each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject 
relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and 
he shall have power to grant Reprieves and Pardons 
for Offenses against the United States, except in 
Cases of Impeachment. 
[2.] He shall have Power, by and with the Advice 
and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, pro-
vided two-thirds of the Senators present concur, and 
he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, 
other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Su-
preme Court, and all other Officers of the United 
States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise 
provided for, and which shall be established by Law: 
but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment 
of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the 
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads 
of Departments. 
[3.] The President shall have Power to fill up all 
Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the 
Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire 
at the End of their next Session. 
Sec. 3. [Miscellaneous powers and duties.] 
He shall from time to time give to the Congress 
Information of the State of the Union, and recom-
mend to their Consideration such Measures as he 
shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on ex-
traordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or ei-
ther of them, and in Case of Disagreement between 
them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he 
may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think 
proper; he shall receive Ambassadors and other pub-
lic Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Of-
ficers of the United States. 
Sec. 4. [Impeachment] 
The President, Vice President and all civil Officers 
of the United States, shall be removed from Office on 
Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Brib-
ery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. 
ARTICLE i n 
[JUDICIAL 
DEPARTMENT] 
Section 
1. [Judicial power.] 
2. [Extent of judicial power — Supreme Court — 
Trial and places of trial.] 
3. [Treason, proof and punishment.] 
Sec. 1. [Judicial power.] 
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be 
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior 
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain 
and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and 
inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good 
Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their 
Services, a Compensation, which shall not be dimin-
ished during their Continuance in Office. 
Sec. 2. [Extent of judicial power — Supreme 
Court — Trial and places of trial] 
[1.] The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in 
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the 
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all 
Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers 
and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime 
Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United 
States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between 
two or more States;—[between a State and Citizens of 
another State;]—between Citizens of different 
States,—between Citizens of the same State claiming 
Lands under Grants of different States, [and between 
a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, 
Citizens or Subjects.] 
[2.] In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other pub-
lic Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State 
shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original 
Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, 
the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, 
both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and 
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make. 
[3.] The Trial of ail Crimes, except in Cases of Im-
peachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be 
held in the State where the said Crimes shall have 
been committed; but when not committed within any 
State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the 
Congress may by Law have directed. 
Sec. 3. [Treason, proof and punishment.] 
[1.] Treason against the United States, shall con-
sist only in levying War against them, or in adhering 
to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No 
Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the 
Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or 
on Confession in open Court. 
[2.] The Congress shall have Power to declare the 
Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason 
shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except 
during the Life of the Person attainted. 
ARTICLE IV 
[STATE AND 
TERRITORIAL RELATIONS] 
Section 
1. [Full faith and credit to records and judicial pro-
ceedings of states.] 
2. [Privileges and immunities — Fugitives from jus-
tice and service.] 
3. [Admission of states — Rules and regulations re-
specting the territory and property of 
the United States.] 
4. [Guaranty of republican form of government and 
against invasion.] 
Sec. 1. [Full faith and credit to records and ju-
dicial proceedings of states.] 
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State 
to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings 
of every other State. And the Congress may by gen-
eral Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, 
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Amend, i l l CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 446 
AMENDMENT HI AMENDMENT X 
[Quartering soldiers.] 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in 
any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in 
time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law. 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — 
Due process of law and just compensation 
clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment 
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising 
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of 
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT VH 
[Trial by jury in civil cases.] 
In Suits at common law, where the value in contro-
versy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by 
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, 
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the 
United States, than according to the rules of the com-
mon law. 
AMENDMENT V m 
[Bail — Punishment] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted. 
AMENDMENT IX 
[Rights retained by people.] 
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage 
others retained by the people. 
[Powers reserved to states or people.] 
The powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, 
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the peo-
ple. 
AMENDMENT XI 
[Suits against states — Restriction of judicial 
power.] 
The judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, com-
menced or prosecuted against one of the United 
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
Subjects of any Foreign State. 
AMENDMENT XII 
[Election of President and Vice-President] 
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, 
and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, 
one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of 
the same state with themselves; they shall name in 
their ballots the person voted for as President, and in 
distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-Presi-
dent, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons 
voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as 
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, 
which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit 
sealed to the seat of the Government of the United 
States, directed to the President of the Senate;—The 
President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the 
Senate and House of Representatives, open all the 
certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—The 
person having the greatest number of votes for Presi-
dent, shall be the President, if such number be a ma-
jority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and 
if no person have such majority, then from the per-
sons having the highest numbers not exceeding three 
on the list of those voted for as President, the House 
of Representatives shall choose immediately, by bal-
lot, the President. But in choosing the President, the 
votes shall be taken by states, the representation 
from each state having one vote; a quorum for this 
purpose shall consist of a member or members from 
two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the 
states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House 
of Representatives shall not choose a President when-
ever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, be-
fore the fourth day of March next following, then the 
Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of 
the death or other constitutional disability of the 
President.—The person having the greatest number 
of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-Presi-
dent, if such number be a majority of the whole num-
ber of Electors appointed, and if no person have a 
majority, then from the two highest numbers on the 
list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a 
quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of 
the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the 
whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no 
person constitutionally ineligible to the office of Pres-
ident shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the 
United States. 
AMENDMENT X1H 
Section 
1. [Slavery prohibited.] 
2. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
PREAMBLE 
Article 
I Declaration of Rights. 
II State Boundaries. 
III. Ordinance. 
IV. Elections and Right of Suffrage. 
V. Distribution of Powers. 
VI. Legislative Department. 
VII. Executive Department. 
VIII. Judicial Department. 
IX. Congressional and Legislative Apportion-
ment. 
X. Education. 
XI Counties, Cities and Towns. 
XII Corporations. 
XIII. Revenue and Taxation. 
XIV. Public Debt. 
XV. Militia. 
XVI Labor. 
XVII Water Rights. 
XVIII. Forestry. 
XIX. Public Buildings and State Institutions. 
XX. Public Lands. 
XXI. Salaries. 
XXII. Miscellaneous. 
XXIII Amendment and Revision. 
XXIV. Schedule. 
PREAMBLE 
Grateful to Almighty God for life and liberty, we, 
the people of Utah, in order to secure and perpetuate 
the principles of free government, do ordain and es-
tablish this CONSTITUTION. 1896 
ARTICLE I 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
Section 
1 (Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
2 (AH political power inherent in the people.] 
3. (Utah inseparable from the Union.] 
4. (Religious liberty — No property qualification to 
vote or hold office.] 
5 (Habeas corpus ] 
6. (Right to bear arms.] 
7. |Due process of law.] 
8. |Offen8es bailable.] 
9 (Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.] 
10. ITrial by jury.J 
11 (Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
12. IRights of accused persons.] 
13. (Prosecution by information or indictment — 
Grand jury.] 
14. (Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of 
warrant.] 
15 (Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.] 
16. (No imprisonment for debt — Exception.] 
17. (Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.] 
18. (Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing 
contracts.) 
19 (Treason defined — Proof.] 
20. |Military subordinate to the civil power.] 
21 (Slavery forbidden.) 
22 (Private property for public use.) 
23. (Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
Section 
24. | Uniform operation of laws.] 
25. (Rights retained by people.] 
26. (Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.] 
27. [Fundamental rights.] 
Section 1. (Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to 
enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, 
possess and protect property; to worship according to 
the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peace-
ably, protest against wrongs, and petition for redress 
of grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts 
and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that 
right. 1896 
Sec. 2. [All political power inherent in the peo-
ple] 
All political power is inherent in the people; and all 
free governments are founded on their authori ty for 
their equal protection and benefit, and they have the 
r ight to alter or reform their government as the pub-
lic welfare may require. 1896 
Sec . 3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.) 
The State of Utah is an inseparable par t of the 
Federal Union and the Constitution of the United 
States is the supreme law of the land. 1896 
Sec . 4. [Religious l iberty — No property qualifi-
cation to vote or hold office.] 
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. 
The State shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; no religious test shall be required as a quali-
fication for any office of public trust or for any vote at 
any election; nor shall any person be incompetent as 
a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the 
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church 
and State, nor shall any church dominate the State or 
interfere with its functions. No public money or prop-
erty shall be appropriated for or applied to any reli-
gious worship, exercise or instruction, or for the sup-
port of any ecclesiastical establishment. No property 
qualification shall be required of any person to vote, 
or hold office, except as provided in this Constitution. 
1896 
Sec. 5. [Habeas corpus.] 
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not 
be suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, 
the public safety requires it.
 f 1896 
Sec. 0. [Right to bear arms.] 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear 
arms for security and defense of self, family, others, 
property, or the state, as well as for other lawful pur-
poses shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall 
prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use 
of arms. ISM 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.) 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or prop-
erty, without due process of law. 1896 
Sec. 8. [Offenses bailable.] 
(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bail-
able except: 
(a) persons charged with a capital offense 
when there is substantial evidence to support the 
charge; or 
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(b) persons charged with a felony while on pro-
bation or parole, or while free on bail awaiting 
trial on a previous felony charge, when there is 
substantial evidence to support the new felony 
charge; or 
(c) persons charged with any other crime, des-
ignated by s ta tu te as one for which bail may be 
denied, if there is substantial evidence to support 
the charge and the court finds by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the person would consti-
tu te a substant ial danger to any other person or 
to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdic-
tion of the court if released on bail. 
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pend-
ing appeal only as prescribed by law. 1988 
Sec. 9. [Excess ive bail and fines — Cruel pun-
ishments . ] 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines 
shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual 
punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or impris-
oned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor. 1896 
Sec. 10. [Trial b y jury.] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall re-
main inviolate. In courts of general jurisdiction, ex-
cept in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight ju-
rors. In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall con-
sist of four jurors . In criminal cases the verdict shall 
be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the ju-
rors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be 
waived unless demanded. 1896 
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury done to him in his person, property or reputa-
tion, shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary 
delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting 
or defending before any tribunal in this State, by 
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a 
party. 1896 
Sec. 12. IRights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, 
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his 
own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against 
him, to have compulsory process to compel the atten-
dance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or dis-
trict in which the offense is alleged to have been com-
mitted, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judg-
ment, be compelled to advance money or fees to se-
cure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall 
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a 
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her hus-
band, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any 
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
1896 
Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indict-
ment — Grand jury.l 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by 
indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after 
examination and commitment by a magistrate, un-
less the examination be waived by the accused with 
the consent of the State, or by indictment, with or 
without such examination and commitment. The for-
mation of the grand jury and the powers and duties 
thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 1947 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden -
Issuance of warrant.) 
The right of the people to be secure in their pei 
sons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonabl 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and n 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause su( 
ported by oath or affirmation, particularly describin 
the place to be searched, and the person or thing to t 
seized. IH« 
Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press -
Libel.] 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain tl 
freedom of speech or of the press. In all criminal pro 
ecutions for libel the truth may be given in evident 
to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that tl 
matter charged as libelous is true, and was publish* 
with good motives, and for justifiable ends, the pari 
shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the ri|;l 
to determine the law and the fact. IP 
Sec. 16. (No imprisonment for debt — Excci 
tlon.] 
There shall be no Imprisonment for debt except 
cases of absconding debtors. i r 
Sec. 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers votint 
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil 
military, shall at any time interfere to prevent t1 
free exercise of the right of suffrage. Soldiers, in tii 
of war, may vote at their post of duty, in or out of t 
State, under regulations to be prescribed by law. i • 
Sec. 18. (Attainder — Ex post facto laws — I* 
pairing contracts.] 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law i 
pairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed 
r 
Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.] 
Treason against the State shall consist only 
levying war against it, or in adhering to its enem 
or in giving them aid and comfort. No person shall 
convicted of treason unless on the testimony of t 
witnesses to the same overt act. i 
Sec. 20. [Military subordinate to the ci 
power.] 
The military shall be in strict subordination to t 
civil power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall 
quartered in any house without the consent of i 
owner; nor in time of war except in a manner to 
prescribed by law. i 
Sec. 21. [Slavery forbidden.] 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, exc 
as a punishment for crime, whereof the party si 
have been duly convicted, shall exist within t 
State. 
Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.) 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged 
public use without just compensation. 
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden. 1 
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably . 
franchise, privilege or immunity. 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have unif< 
operation. 
Sec. 25. [Rights retained by people.] 
This enumeration of rights shall not be consti 
to impair or deny others retained by the people. 
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FEDERAL RULES 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
FOR THE 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT 
COURTS 
For effective dates, see Rule 86 
Rule 23. Class Actions 
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may 
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class 
is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are 
questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of 
the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, 
and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the 
interests of the class. 
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class 
action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition: 
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members 
of the class would create a risk of 
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual 
members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of 
conduct for the party opposing the class, or 
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class 
which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the 
other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair 
or impede their ability to protect their interests; or 
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds 
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final 
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the 
class as a whole; or 
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the 
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only 
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available 
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The 
matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of 
the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of 
1 
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separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning 
the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; 
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the 
claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encoun-
tered in the management of a class action. 
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Actions to be Maintained; 
Notice; Judgment; Actions Conducted Partially as Class Actions. (1) As 
soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a 
class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so 
maintained. An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and 
may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits. 
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court 
shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under 
the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can 
be identified through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each 
member that (A) the court will exclude him from the class if he so 
requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, 
will include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any 
member who does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an 
appearance through his counsel. 
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under 
subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall 
include and describe those whom the court finds to be members of the 
class. The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under 
subdivision (b)(3), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include 
and specify or describe those to whom the notice provided in subdivision 
(c)(2) was directed, and who have not requested exclusion, and whom 
the court finds to be members of the class. 
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a 
class action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be 
divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the 
provisions of this rule shall then be construed and applied accordingly. 
(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to which this 
rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders: (1) determining the 
course of proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition 
or complication in the presentation of evidence or argument; (2) requiring, 
for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair 
conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as the court 
may direct to some or all of the members of any step in the action or of 
the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to 
signify whether they consider the representation fair and adequate, to 
intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the 
action; (3) imposing conditions on the representative parties or on interve-
nors; (4) requiring that the pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom 
allegations as to representation of absent persons, and that the action 
2 
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proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with similar procedural matters. The 
orders may be combined with an order under Rule 16, and may be altered 
or amended as may be desirable from time to time. 
(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or 
compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed 
dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such 
manner as the court directs. 
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 
Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules. 
Note to Subdivision (a). This is a substantial restatement of former 
Equity Rule 38 (Representatives of Class) as that rule has been 
construed. It applies to all actions, whether formerly denominated legal 
or equitable. For a general analysis of class actions, effect of judgment, 
and requisites of jurisdiction see Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure: Some Problems Raised by the Preliminary Draft, 25 Georgetown 
L J 551, 570 et scq (1937); Moore and Cohn, Federal Class Actions, 
32 111 L Rev 307 (1937); Moore and Cohn, Federal Class Actions-
Jurisdiction and Effect of Judgment, 32 111 L Rev 555-567 (1938); 
Lesar, Class Suits and the Federal Rules, 22 Minn L Rev 34 (1937); cf. 
Arnold and James, Cases on Trials, Judgments and Appeals (1936) 
175; and see Blume, Jurisdictional Amount in Representative Suits, 15 
Minn L Rev 501 (1931). 
The general test of former Equity Rule 38 (Representatives of Class) 
that the question should be "one of common or general interest to 
many persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracti-
cable to bring them all before the court," is a common test. For states 
which require the two elements of a common or general interest and 
numerous persons, as provided for in former Equity Rule 38, see Del 
Ch Rule 113; Fla Comp Gen Laws Ann (Supp, 1936) §4918(7); 
Georgia Code (1933) §37-1002, and see English Rules Under the 
Judicature Act (The Annual Practice, 1937) O. 16, r. 9. For statutory 
provisions providing for class actions when the question is one of 
common or general interest or when the parties are numerous, see Ala 
Code Ann (Michie, 1928) §5701; 2 Ind Stat Ann (Bums, 1933) §2-
220; NYCPA (1937) § 195; Wis Stat (1935) §260.12. These statutes 
have, however, been uniformly construed as though phrased in the 
conjunctive. See Garfein v Stiglitz, 260 Ky 430, 86 SW2d 155 (1935). 
The rule adopts the test of former Equity Rule 38, but defines what 
constitutes a "common or general interest". Compare with code provi-
sions which make the action dependent upon the propriety of joinder of 
the parties. See Blume, The "Common Questions" Principle in the 
Code Provision for Representative Suits, 30 Mich L Rev 878 (1932). 
For discussion of what constitutes "numerous persons" see Wheaton, 
Representative Suits Involving Numerous Litigants, 19 Corn L Q 399 
(1934); Note, 36 Harv L Rev 89 (1922). 
Clause (1), Joint, Common, or Secondary Right. This clause is illus-
trated in actions brought by or against representatives of an unincorpo-
rated association. See Oster v Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and 
3 
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Terry's Sales, Inc v. Vander Veur, 618 P 2d 29 
(Utah 1980). 
Taxation. 
Complaint by taxpayer to compel two coun-
ties to interplead as to which was entitled to 
tax as result of apportionment by State Tax 
Commission was held insufficient. See Union 
Pac. R R v. Summit County, 48 Utah 540, 161 
P 463 (1916). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 45 Am. Jur. 2d Interpleader tion in absence of contract or statute fixing 
$ 29 et seq amount, 57 A L R.3d 475 
C.J.S. — 48 C J.S Interpleader 8 11. Key Numbers. — Interpleader «=» 14. 
A.L.R. — Amount of attorney's compensa-
t i v e 23. Class act ions . 
(a) P re requ i s i t e s to a c lass ac t ion. One or more members of a class may 
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is 
so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are ques-
tions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the 
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) 
the representative parties wiJJ fairly and adequately protect the interests of 
the class. 
(b) Class ac t ions ma in ta inab le . An action may be maintained as a class 
action if the prerequisites of Subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition: 
(1) The prosecution of separate actions by or against individual mem-
bers of the class would create a risk of: 
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individ-
ual members of the class which would establish incompatible stan-
dards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or 
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class 
which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of 
the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially 
impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or 
(2) The party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds 
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final in-
junctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class 
as a whole; or 
(3) The court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the 
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only indi-
vidual members, and that a class action is superior to other available 
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The 
matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of 
the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate 
actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the contro-
versy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the 
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims 
in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the 
management of a class action. 
Termination. 
—Decision on all issues. 
If the action in interpleader accomplishes 
the purpose for which the plaintiff instituted it, 
it is not necessarily a requisite to its termina-
tion that it decide all of the issues between the 
adverse claimants. Terry's Sales. Inc. v. 
Vander Veur, 618 P 2d 29 (Utah 1980). 
70 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 23 
(c) De te rmina t ion by o rde r whe the r class ac t ion to be ma in t a ined ; 
not ice; j u d g m e n t ; ac t ions conducted par t ia l ly a s c lass ac t ions . 
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought 
as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be 
maintained. An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may 
be altered or amended before the decision on the merits. 
(2) In any class action maintained under Subdivision (b)(3), the court 
shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under 
the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be 
identified through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member 
that (A) the court will exclude him from the class if he so requests by a 
specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all 
members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not 
request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his 
counsel. 
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under Sub-
division (b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include 
and describe those whom the court finds to be members of the class. The 
judgment in an action maintained as a class action under Subdivision 
(b)(3), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and specify or 
describe those to whom the notice provided in Subdivision (c)(2) was di-
rected, and who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds 
to be members of the class. 
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a 
class action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided 
into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of 
this rule shall then be construed and applied accordingly. 
(d) O r d e r s in conduc t of act ions. In the conduct of actions to which this 
rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders: (1) determining the 
course of proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition or 
complication in the presentation of evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for 
the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of 
the action, that notice be given in such manner as the court may direct to 
some or all of the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent 
of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether they 
consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims 
or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action; (3) imposing conditions on 
the representative parties or on intervenors; (4) requiring that the pleadings 
be amended to eliminate therefrom allegations as to representation of absent 
persons, and that the action proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with similar 
procedural matters. The orders may be combined with an order under Rule 16, 
and may be altered or amended as may be desirable from time to time. 
(e) Dismissal o r compromise . A class action shall not be dismissed or 
compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed 
dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such 
manner as the court directs. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is identical Antidiscrimination Act, $ 34-35-1 et seq 
to Rule 23, F R C P . Appearance by attorney, proof of authority, 
Cross-References. — Advancement, con- § 78-51-33 
duct, and hearing of actions, orders for, reason- Capacity to sue or be sued need not be 
able notice, Rule 78 averred, Rule 9(a)(1). 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Action barred. 
—Plaintiffs not shareholders at time of wrong-
ful act. 
Class action distinguished. 
Action barred. 
—Plaintiffs not shareholders at time of 
wrongful act. 
Shareholders' action against former corpo-
rate directors and nlluns for alleged conver-
sion of corporate assets and for breach of fidu-
ciary duties was haired by this rule where the 
shareholders did not acquire their stock until 
after the events complained of and the shares 
did not devolve on them by operation of law. 
Noland v. Barton, 741 F.2d 315 (10th Cir. 
1984). 
Class action distinguished. 
Action by corporate shareholders which al-
leged injury to the corporation only, and not to 
them as individuals, was a derivative action 
and could not be brought as a class action. 
Richardson v. Arizona Fuels Corp., 614 P.2d 
636 (Utah 1980). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations 
§ 2250. 
C.J.S. - 18 C.J.S. Corporations §§ 564 to 
566. 
A.L.R. — Communications by corporation as 
privileged in stockholders' action, 34 A.L.R.3d 
1106. 
Allowance of punitive damages in stock-
holder's derivative action, 67 A.L.R.3d 350. 
Application to derivative actions for breach 
of fiduciary duty, under § 36(b) of Investment 
Company Act of 1940 (15 USC 5 80a-35(b)), of 
requirement, stated in Rule 23.1 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure that complaint in de-
rivative actions allege what efforts were made 
by shareholders to obtain desired action or rea-
sons for failure to do so, 65 A.L.R. Fed. 542. 
Key Numbers. — Corporations «=» 206, 207. 
Rule 24. Intervention. 
(a) Intervention of right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permit-
ted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers an unconditional right 
to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the 
property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated 
that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede 
his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is ade-
quately represented by existing parties. 
(b) Permissive intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be per-
mitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers a conditional right 
to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action 
have a question of law or fact in common. When a party to an action relies for 
ground of claim or defense upon any statute or executive order administered 
by a governmental officer or agency or upon any regulation, order, require-
ment, or agreement issued or made pursuant to the statute or executive order, 
the officer or agency upon timely application may be permitted to intervene in 
the action. In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the 
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of 
the original parties. 
(c) Procedure. A person desiring to intervene shall serve a motion to inter-
vene upon the parties as provided in Rule 5. The motions shall state the 
grounds therefor and shall be accompanied by a pleading setting forth the 
claim or defense for which intervention is sought. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
74 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 24 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 24, F R C P . 
Cross-Refercnces. — Claims for relief and 
defenses, Rule 8. 
Fee for filing complaint in intervention, 
§§ 78-3-16.5, 78-4-24, 78-6-14. 
Form for motion to intervene as defendant, 
Form 24. 
Appeal. 
—Order denying intervention. 
Intervention of right. 
—Adverse effect. 
Court's disposition of property. 
—Insurer. 
Uninsured motorist coverage. 
Jurisdiction. 
—Error by court clerk. 
Postjudgment intervention. 
—Not allowed. 
—Showing required. 
Timeliness. 
Appeal. 
—Order denying intervention. 
Order which denies with prejudice an appli-
cation for intervention is appealable. Tracy v. 
University of Utah Hosp., 619 P.2d 340 (Utah 
1980). 
Intervention of right. 
—Adverse effect. 
Court's disposition of property. 
When the application for intervention is 
made timely, this rule permits intervention as 
a matter of right when the applicant will be 
adversely affected by the trial court's disposi-
tion of property. Jenner v. Real Estate Servs., 
659 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1983). 
—Insurer. 
Uninsured motorist coverage. 
Where interests of insurance company pro-
viding uninsured motorist coverage would not 
be adequately represented in a tot J net ion be-
tween its insured as plaintiff and an uninsured 
motorist tort-feasor as defendant, insurance 
company was entitled to intervene as a party 
defendant as of right. Lima v. Chambers, 657 
P.2d 279 (Utah 1982). 
Misjoinder and nonjoinder of parties, Rule 
21. 
Necessary joinder of parties, Rule 19. 
Parties plaintiff and defendant; capacity, 
Rule 17. 
Permissive joinder of parties, Rule 20. 
—Error by court clerk. 
Court erred in dismissing for failure of juris-
diction a complaint in intervention which court 
clerk had erroneously put in different file than 
that of the original action, where all the pnr-
ties had notice of the intervention and made no 
objection to the presence of intervener's attor-
ney at the trial. Centurian Corp. v. Crippi. 577 
P.2d 955 (Utah 1978). 
Postjudgment intervention. 
—Not allowed. 
Undisclosed partner of a purchaser under a 
land sale contract was not entitled to intervene 
after default judgment had been entered in an 
action to declare a forfeiture of the contract 
since the undisclosed partner permitted his 
partner to assume the role of sole owner of 
their interest under the contract and the 
known purchaser had been duly served with 
notice of default in the contract payments and 
for demand for payment and had been duly 
served with summons in the forfeiture action. 
Jenner v. Real Estate Servs., 659 P.2d 1072 
(Utah 1983). 
—Showing required. 
Generally, intervention is not permitted af-
ter entry of judgment, with exceptions to this 
general rule made only upon a strong showing 
of entitlement and justification, or such un-
usual or compelling circumstances as will jus-
tify the failure to seek intervention earlier. 
Jenner v. Real Estate Servs., 659 P.2d 1072 
(Utah 1983). 
Timeliness. 
Use of the word "timely" in Subdivisions (a) 
and (b) requires that the timeliness of the ap-
plication for intervention be determined under 
the facts and circumstances of each particular 
case, and in the sound discretion of the court. 
Jenner v. Real Estate Servs., 659 P.2d 1072 
(Utah 1983); Republic Ins. Group v. Doman, 
774 P.2d 1130 (Utah 1989). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Jurisdiction. 
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Rule 10 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
parties shall be designated as "all unknown persons who claim any interest in 
the subject matter of the action." Every pleading and other paper filed with 
the court shall also state the name, address, telephone number and bar num-
ber of any attorney representing the party filing the paper, which information 
shall appear in the top left-hand corner of the first page. Every pleading shall 
state the name and address of the party for whom it is filed; this information 
shall appear in the lower left-hand corner of the last page of the pleading. 
(b) Paragraphs; separate statements. All averments of claim or defense 
shall be made in numbered paragraphs, the contents of each of which shall be 
limited as far as practicable to a statement of a single set of circumstances; 
and a paragraph may be referred to by number in all succeeding pleadings. 
Each claim founded upon a separate transaction or occurrence and each de-
fense other than denials shall be stated in a separate count or defense when-
ever a separation facilitates the clear presentation of the matters set forth. 
(c) Adoption by reference; exhibits. Statements in a pleading may be 
adopted by reference in a different part of the same pleading or in another 
pleading, or in any motion. An exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all 
purposes. 
(d) P«pi-r quality, size, style and printing. All pleadings and other pa-
pers filed with the court, except printed documents or other exhibits, shall be 
typewritten, printed or photocopied in black type on good, white, unglazed 
paper of letter size (8V2" x 11"), with a top margin of not less than 2 inches 
above any typed material, a left-hand margin of not less than 1 inch, a right-
hand margin of not less than one-half inch, and a bottom margin of not less 
than one-half inch. All typing or printing shall be clearly legible, shall be 
double-spaced, except for matters customarily single-spaced or indented, and 
shall not be smaller than pica size. Typing or printing shall appear on one side 
of the page only. 
(e) Signature line. Names shall be typed or printed under all signature 
lines, and all signatures shall be made in permanent black or blue ink. 
(0 Enforcement by clerk; waiver for pro se parties. The clerk of the 
court shall examine all pleadings and other papers filed with the court. If they 
are not prepared in conformity with this rule, the clerk shall accept the filing 
but may require counsel to substitute properly prepared papers for noncon-
forming papeis. The clerk or the court may waive the requirements of this 
rule for parties appearing pro se. For good cause shown, the court may relieve 
any party of any requirement of this rule. 
(g) Replacing lost pleadings or papers. If an original pleading or paper 
filed in any action or proceeding is lost, the court may, upon motion, with or 
without notice, authorize a copy thereof to be filed and used in lieu of the 
original. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1983; April 1, 1990.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — As a general 
mailer, Rule 10 deals with the form of papers 
filed with the court — both "pleadings" as de-
fined in Rule 7(a) and "other papers filed with 
the court," including motions, memoranda, dis-
covery responses, and orders. The changes in 
the present rule were promulgated to clarify 
ambiguities in the prior rule and to address 
specific problems encountered by the courts. 
Paragraphs <b>, (c) and (e) of the rule were not 
changed, except that paragraph (e) was redes-
ignated as (g) and new paragraphs (e) and (0 
were added 
Paragraph (a). This paragraph specifies re-
quirements for captions in every paper filed 
with the court. In addition to the other require-
ments, the caption must contain the name of 
the judge to whom the case is assigned, if the 
judge's name is known at the time the paper is 
filed. In the top left-hand corner 6f the first 
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page, each paper must state identifying infor-
mation concerning the attorney representing 
the party filing the paper. Finally, every plead-
ing must state the name and current address of 
the party for whom it is filed; this information 
should appear on the lower left-hand corner of 
the last page. This information need not be set 
forth in papers other than pleadings. 
Paragraph (d). The changes in this para-
graph make it clear that papers filed with the 
court must be "typewritten, printed or photo-
copied in black type" The Advisory Committee 
considered suggestions from different groups 
that so-called "dot matrix" printing be specifi-
cally allowed or specifically prohibited. The 
Advisory Committee, however, settled on the 
requirements that "typing or printing shall be 
clearly legible ... and shall not be smaller than 
pica size." If typing or printing on papers filed 
with the court complies with these standards, 
the papers should not be deemed to violate the 
rule merely because they were prepared in a 
dot matrix printer. As currently written, this 
paragraph also removes any confusion concern-
ing the top margin and left mnrgin require-
ments (now 2 inches and 1 inch respectively), 
and this paragraph imposes new requirements 
for right and bottom margins (both one-half 
inch). 
Paragraph (e). This paragraph, which is an 
addition to the rule, requires typed signature 
lines and signatures in permanent black or 
blue ink. 
Paragraph (f). The changes in this para-
graph make it clear that the clerk must accept 
all papers for filing, even though they may vio-
late the rule, but the clerk may require counsel 
to substitute conforming for nonconforming pa-
pers. The clerk is given discretion to waive re-
quirements of the rule for parties who are not 
represented by counsel; for good cause shown, 
the court may relieve parties of the obligation 
to comply with the rule or any part of it. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment added "and other papers" to the rule 
catchline and added similar language in two 
places in Subdivision (a); in Subdivision (a), 
added the Inst phrase in (ho subdivision head-
ing, added the last two phrases in the first sen-
tence, deleting "and a designation as in Rule 
(7)(a)," added the last two sentences, and made 
stylistic changes; rewrote Subdivision (d); 
added Subdivisions (e) and (0; and redesig-
nated former Subdivision (e) as Subdivision 
<gl. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 10, F R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Exhibits. 
—Use as pleadings. 
Cited. 
Exhibits. 
—Use as pleadings. 
While an exhibit may be considered as a part 
of a pleading to clarify or explain the same, an 
exhibit to a pleading cannot serve the purpose 
of supplying necessary material averments nor 
can the content of the exhibit be taken as part 
of the allegations of the pleading itself. Girard 
v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983). 
Cited in State ex rel. Cannon v. Leary, 646 
P.2d 727 (Utah 1982). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading 
§§ 23 to 56, 69, 117. 
C.J.S. — 71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 5, 9, 63 to 98, 
371 to 375, 418. 
A.L.R. — Propriety of attaching photo-
graphs to a pleading, 33 A.L.R.3d 322. 
Propriety and effect of use of fictitious name 
of plaintiff in federal court, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 369. 
Key Numbers. — Pleading *=» 4. 13, 15, 38'/2 
to 75, 307 to 312, 340 
Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers; 
sanctions. 
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attor-
ney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name 
who is duly licensed to practice in the state of Utah. The attorney's address 
also shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign 
his pleading, motion, or other paper and state his address. Except when other-
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Rule 11 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
wise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or 
accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer 
under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one 
witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature 
of an attorney or party constitutes a certification by him that he has read the 
pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, informa-
tion, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and 
is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any 
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless 
increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not 
signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is 
called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other 
paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own 
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or 
both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other 
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of 
the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985.) 
Compiler 's Notes . — This rule ia substan-
tially similar to Rule 11, F.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Amendment of complaint. 
Nature of duty imposed. 
Reasonable inquiry. 
Violation. 
—Question of law. 
—Sanctions. 
—Standard 
Cited. 
A m e n d m e n t of compla in t . 
Amendment by an attorney of the facts 
stated in a complaint was sufficient to estab-
lish those facts as they would have been by a 
verified complaint before the changes made by 
this rule making verification unnecessary, 
('alder v. Third Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. Salt 
Lake County, 2 Utah 2d 309, 273 P.2d 168 
(1954) 
Nature of duty i m p o s e d . 
This rule emphasizes an attorney's public 
duty as an officer of the court, as opposed to the 
attorney's private duty to represent a client's 
interest zealously. Clark v. Booth, 168 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 7 (1991). 
Reasonable inquiry. 
Certification by an attorney "that to the best 
of his knowledge, information, and belief 
formed after a reasonable inquiry the com-
plaint is well grounded in fact and is war-
ranted by existing law" does not require him to 
obtain a favorable expert medical opinion be-
fore filing a medical malpractice action. 
Deschamps v. Pulley, 784 P.2d 471 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). 
Violat ion. 
—Quest ion of law. 
Whether specific conduct amounts to a viola-
tion of this rule is a question of law. Taylor v 
Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989); Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991). 
—Sanct ions . 
This rule gives trial courts great leeway to 
tailor the sanction to fit the requirements of 
the particular case. Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 
770 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Imposition of $5,000 in attorney fees as a 
sanction for violating this rule was not an 
abuse of discretion, where the wrong document 
was attached to the complaint, causing defen-
dants to incur legal expense in researching the 
validity of an irrelevant document and prepar-
ing a motion to dismiss based thereon. Taylor 
v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). 
—Standard . 
Sanctions were improper against an attor-
ney, where opposing parties conceded that no 
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particular document was signed in violation of Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202 (Utah Ct. App. 
the rule, but simply argued that even if the 1991). 
attorney believed the case was well grounded . 
when he filed the complaint, he should have « « « ! » « W a k Q e ' v ^ a , r ,SOn« 7f ™ l™ 
known aaer he met with counsel for defen- ^ a h Ct. App.1987); State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 
dants that the case could not go forward. 1 2 0 1 ( U t a h C t APP 1 9 9 1 ) -
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah L a w Review. — Recent Developments Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
in Utah Law — Legislative Enactments — At- eral Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to 
torney's Fees, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 342. signing and verification of pleadings, in ac-
Br igham Y o u n g Law Review. — Curbing tions for defamation, 95 A.L R Fed. 181. 
Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: Enough Is Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
Enough, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev 579. eral Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to 
Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: signing and verification of pleadings, in action 
We're Not There Yet, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 597.
 f o r w r o n g f u i discharge from employment, 96 
Note, Appellate Review of Rule 11 Issues — h\,\x \?Vi\ in. 
De Novo or Abuse of Discretion? Thomas v. i m p o s j l i o n 0 f sanctions under Rule 11. Fed-
Capital Security Services, Inc., 1989 B.Y.U. L.
 e r a ] R u | e g o f C i v i , P r o c e d u r e > pertaining to 
Kev. oil. signing and verification of pleadings, in ac-
i c o ^ n vlTTan, « e d e r o a m g L a W y e r E t h , C S ' tions for securities fraud, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 107. 1991 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 959 . .L. - .. , „ . . . r , 
A , „ . ff.A A i o j m J : Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-Am. Jur . 2d. — 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading • ,, ,
 r r> i n J * • • » KR Qio •„ QAQ eral Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to f>8 339 to 349. . , t- L- c i J-
C.J.S. - 71 C.J S. Pleading §§ 339 to 366. Bl^nin« and verification of pleadings, in ac-
A . L . R . - L i a b i l i t y of attorney, acting for cli- «<»» f o r infliction of emotional distress, 98 
ent, for malicious prosecution, 46 A.L.R.4th A.L.R. Fed. 442. 
249 Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
Inherent power of federal district court to eral Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to 
impose monetary sanctions on counsel in ab- signing and verification of pleadings, in anti-
sence of contempt of court, 77 A.L.R. Fed. 789. trust actions, 99 A.L.R. Fed. 573. 
Comment Note — General principles regard- Procedural requirements for imposition of 
ing imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed- sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil 
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, 95 A.L.R. Fed. Procedure, 100 A L.R. Fed. 556. 
107. Key N u m b e r s . — Pleading «= 287 to 304. 
Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
(a) When presented. A defendant shall serve his answer within twenty 
days after the service of the summons and complaint is complete unless other-
wise expressly provided by statute or order of the court. A party served with a 
pleading stating a cross-claim against him shall serve an answer thereto 
within twenty days after the service upon him. The plaintiff shall serve his 
reply to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the 
answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service 
of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under 
this rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed 
by order of the court: 
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the 
trial on the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten 
days after notice of the court's action; 
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the 
responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of 
the more definite statement. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any 
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-patty claim, 
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ROBERT J. DEBRY 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
965 East 4800 South, Suite 2 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84117 
Telephone: (801) 26 2-8915 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE K. SCHONEY and 
IRMA J. SCHONEY, for 
themselves and all others 
similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
MEMORIAL ESTATES, INC. and, 
MEMORIAL ESTATES CEMETERY 
DEVELOPMENT CORP., corpora-
tion and JOHN DOES 1 through 
1C, individuals, 
Defendants 
ORDER 
Civil No. C 82-4983 
Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification was heard by 
the Court on December 14, 1982. Plaintiff was represented by 
Robert J. DeBry. Defendant was represented by David Swope. 
The Court has considered the nemoranda and the arguments of 
counsel. 
The Court now makes the following findings: 
1. Defendant has sold a total of 124 crypts at their 
Mountain View Cemetery. Defendant has sold an 
additional 388 crypts at their Redwood Road Cemetery. 
The total of 512 satisfies the numerosity requirement 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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of Rule 23(a)(1) U.R.C.P. If it becomes necessary to 
divide the class into subclasses under Rule 23 
(c) (4) (B) ; the Redwood Road subclass would indepen-
dently satisfy the numerosity requirement and the 
Mountain View subclass would independently satisfy 
the numerosity requirement. 
All members of the class have executed identical 
contract forms. The standard form contract satisfies 
the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) U.R.C.P. 
Some common issues are: when is defendant required 
to build the mausoleums? Has defendant oversold the 
existing mausoleum facilities? Is defendant 
obligated to provide chapel space? 
The Schoneys signed the same form contract which was 
signed by other class members. Therefore the 
Schoneys satisfy the typicality requirement of Rule 
23(a) (3) U.R.C.P. 
Defendants have stipulated that plaintiffs1 counsel 
will fairly and adequately protect the interests of 
the class; and the provision of Rule 23(a)(4) 
U.R.C.P. is therefore satisfied. 
Defendant must build a mausoleum for everyone—or no 
mausoleum at all. Moreover, defendant must build a 
chapel for everyone—or no mausoleum at all. 
Defendant cannot be ordered by one court to build a 
chapel, only to have another court order them not to 
build a chapel. Therefore, this case satisfies Rule 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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23(b)(1)(A) U.R.C.P. in that inconsistent adjudica-
tions with respect to individual members of the class 
would create a risk of establishing incompatible 
standards of conduct for the party opposing the 
class. 
6. This case also satisfies the requirements of Rule 
23(b)(3) U.R.C.P. in that common questions predomi-
nate over individual questions. 
Based on the foregoing findings it is hereby ordered that: 
1* This case is hereby certified to proceed as a class 
action. 
2. The class members are all those persons who have 
signed a standard form agreement for the purchase of 
mausoleum space from defendant. 
3. It will not be necessary to create sub-classes at the 
present time. 
4. The class will be certified under Rule 23(b) (1) (A) , 
U.C.R.P. In order to give res judicata effect to 
the entire class, the case will not be certified 
under Rule 23(b)(3) U.R.C.P., Johnson v. Baton Rouge, 
50 F.R.D. 295(1970). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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5. Because the class is certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) 
U.R.C.P., it will not be necessary to give notice. 
Rule 23(c) (2) U.R.C.P. 
BY THE COURT: 
PHILIP FISCHLER 
Approved as to form 
DAVID SWOPE 
, •' • • Approved as to form 
ROBERT J. DEBRY 
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George Schoney, et al - Appellant 
VS 
Memorial Estates - Respondent »•i i~ ' 
\s* * 
I N D E X 
District Court No. C82-49S3 
Supreme Court No. 880317 
Clerkfs Certificate 1 
Complaint 2-11 
Plaintiffs' Fir^t Set of Interrogatories 
To Defendant Memorial Estates, Inc* 12-34 
Summons 35-36, 37-38 
Answer 39-44 
Plaintiffs' Second Set of 
Interrogatories 45-49 
Answers To Plaintiffs1 First Set Of 
Interrogatories To Defendant 
Memorial Estates, Inc 50-108 
Answers To Second Set of Plaintiffs? 
Interrogatories 109-115 
Request For Production of Documents 115A-117 
Memorandum In Support of Motion For 
Class Certification 118-124 
Notice of Depositions 125-126 
Motion To Amend 127 
First Amended Complaint 128-135 
Notice of Hearing 136-137 
Response Of Defendants Memorial Estates, 
Inc., And Memorial Estates Cemetery 
Development Corp., To Plaintiff's 
Request For Production of Documents 138—140 
Defendants Memorandum In Opposition 
To Plaintiffs Motion For Class 
Certification 141-145 
Affidavit of Kenith Hughes 146-147 
Amended Notice of Hearing 148-149 
Counter Affidavit of George Schoney 150-151 
Notice of Hearing 152 
Answer To First Amended Complaint 153-159 
Minute Entry Dated Nov 5, 1982 160 
Reply To Defendant's Memorandum In 
Opposition To Plaintiff's Motion 
For Class Certification 161-165 
Objection To Proposed Order 166-167 
Defendant's Motion To Dismiss Count I 
And Count IV Of Plaintiffs' First 
Amended Complaint 168-169 
Minute Entry Dated Nov 17, 1982 170 
Order 171-172 
Affidavit of Kenith Hughes 173-176 
Renewed Notice of Hearing 177 
Memorian Estates, Inc.'s 
Supplemental Memorandum Of Points 
And Authorities In Opposition 
To Plaintiffs' Motion To Determine Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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 v s 
Memories Estates - Respondent 
I N D E X (pg 2) 
District Court No, C82-4983 
Supreme Court No. 880317 
Minute Entry Dated Dec 14, 1982 185 
Minute Entry Dated Jan 18, 1983 186 
Correspondence 187-190 
Objections To Proposed Order On 
Class Certification 191-195 
Minute Entry Dated Feb 1, 1983 196 
Second Request For Production of 
Documents 197-201 
Order 202-204 
Amended Notice of-Depositions 205-206 
Ruling On Objections 207-208 
Defendant's First Request For Admissions 
To Plaintiff 209-211 
Request For Production of Documents 212-213 
Defendants First Set of Interrogatories 
To Plaintiffs 214-222 
Second Amended Notice of Depositions 223-224 
.-.Third Request For Production of Documents 225-228 
Notice of Depositions 229-230 
Defendant's Second Requests For Admissions 231-233 
Notice of Taking Deposition 234-235 
Answers To Defendant's First Set Of 
Interrogatories 236-250 
Answers To Defendant's Request For 
Admissions 251-256 
Response To Defendants1 
Request For Production of Documents 257-259 
Motion For An Order That Rule 23(c) 
Shall Apply To The DDnstruction Of 
Any Future Mausoleums And To The Re-
habilitation of The Chapel 260-261 
Notice of Hearing 262 
Certification of Readiness For Trial 263 
Minute Entry Dated May 10, 1983 264 
Renewal Notice of Hearing On Moyion For 
An Order That Rule 23(c) Shall Apply 
To The Construction Of Any Future 
Mausoleums And To The Rehabilitation 
Of The Chapel 265-266 
Notice of Hearing 267r-268 
Objection To Plaintiffs' Certification For 
Readiness For Trial 269-270 
Minute Entry Dated May 24, 1983 271 
Renewal Notice of Hearing On Motion For An 
Order That Rule 23 (c) Shall Apply To 
The Construction Of Any Future Maus-
oleums And To The Rehabilitation Of 
The Chapel 272-273 
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ueu J. Lie tJ v_ i ivy i 
vs 
Memorial Estates - Respondents 
I N D E X (pg 3) 
District Court No. C82-4983 
Supreme Court No- 880317 
Notice of Hearing 
"Motion To Amend 
Motion To Enlarge Class 
Memorandum In Support of Motion To 
Enlarge Class 
Second Amended Complaint 
Notice of Hearing 
Minute Entry Dated Jun 17, 1983 
Motion That Notice Be Given To Class 
Members Prior To Any Construction 
For New Mausoleum Space Or Rehabili-
tation Of The Chapel 
Answer To Second Amended Complaint 
Order 
Interrogatories 
Defendant Memorial Estates In. Second 
Request For Admission To The Plaintiffs 
Minute Entry Dated Aug 1, 1983 
Order 
Objection To Order 
Motion FOE Relief From Order 
Answers To Defendants1 Second'Request 
For Admissions 
Answers To Defendantsf Second Set Of 
Interrogatories 
Motion To Amend Order 
Subpoena Duces Tecum 
Affidavit 
Notice of Hearing 
Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial 
Summary Judgment 
Memorandum In Support of Plaintiffs1 
Motion For Partial Summary 
Judgment 
Minute Entry Dated Spe 2, 1983 
Notice of Hearing 
Certification of Readiness For Trial 
Notice of Continuance 
Notice of Hearing 
Defendant Memorial Estates, Inc.Ts 
Memorandum In Opposition To 
Plaintiff's Motion For Partial 
Summary Judgment 
Affidavit of Delmar Holt, Jr. 
Affidavit Of Kenith Hughes 
Minute Entry Dated Oct 7, 1983 
Notice 
274-275 
276-277 
278-279 
280-291 
292-308 
309 
310 
311-312 
313-325 
326-328 
328A-332 
333-335 
336 
337-339 
340-345 
346-351 
352-355 
356-364 
365-366 
367-367A 
368-369 
370-371 
372-374 
375-386 
387 
388-389 
390 
391-392 
393-394 
395-404 
405-406 
407-409 
410 
411 
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ROBERT J. DE3RY - AO04 9 
ROBERT J. DE3RY ft ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
4001 South 700 East, Suite*500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
GEORGE K. SCHONEY and 
ERMA J. SCHONEY, et al. , 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS, 
Defendants/Respondents. ] 
) PETITION 
) MANDAMUS 
) COURT OF 
i Case No. 
FOR WRIT OF 
TO THE UTAH 
APPEALS 
Plaintiffs-Appellants (hereinafter Schoneys) petition 
this Court for a Writ of Mandamus compelling the Court of 
Appeals to receive the Brief of Appellant dated February 21, 
1989. This petition is supported by the memorandum of points 
and authorities filed herewith. 
INTERESTED PARTIES 
The interested parties to this petition include: 
Memorial Estates, Inc. (Defendant-appellee below); the Utah 
Court of Appeals; and petitioners (plaintiffs-appellants). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether the Court of Aooeals has Dower to refuse 
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to extend time for filing a brief without considering the "good 
cause" for the delay. 
2. Whether the Court of Appeals should be required 
to honor its own order (or letter) which granted a continuance 
for filing a Brief, 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
1. A writ directing the Court of Appeals to receive 
petitioner's appeal brief dated February 24, 1989. 
REASONS FOR EXTRAORDINARY WRIT 
The facts necessary to consider the issues presented 
by this petition are set forth in the supporting memorandum 
filed separately. The reasons why no other relief is adequate, 
and the orders necessary to consider the petition, are also set 
forth in the supporting memorandum and appendix. 
DATED this day of / c<C— "Tfkfl^ 1989. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
Bv: 
ROBERT~3. DESRY ts=>t 
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BEFORE THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
GEORGE K. SCHONEY and ERMA 
J. SCHANEY, et. al. , 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
MEMORIAL ESTATES, INC., 
et. al., 
Defendants and Appellees 
Case No. 890213 
ORAL ARGUMENTS 
FROM ELECTRONICS TAPES 
TAKEN AT: Supreme Court, 332 State Capitol, salt LaKe city, 
Utah 
DATE: December 4, 1989 
REPORTED BY: Beverly Lowe. CSR 
From the Reporting Offices of: 
9837 
File No. 
Capitol Reporters 
P. O. Box 1477, Salt Uke City, Utah 84110 
(801) 363-7939 
DISCOVERT ZX-
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EDWARD WELLS 
DeBry & Associates 
4252 South 700 East 
Murray, Utah 84107 
STEVEN HENRIOD 
HENRIOD & HENRIOD 
60 East South Temple #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
JUDGE GORDON R. HALL 
322 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
JUDGE MICHAEL D. ZIMMERMAN 
322 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
JUDGE CHRISTINE M. DURHAM 
322 State Capitol-Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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1 Monday, December 4, 1989, 9:00 a.m. (tape) 
2 LAW AND MOTION 
3 Appellant's Motion to Recall Jurisdiction 
4 
5 THE COURT: Moving to Number 3, Schoney 
6 versus Memorial Estates. 
7 MR. WELLS: I'm Edward Wells, appearing on 
8 behalf of the Schoneys. Your Honor, basically the 
9 relief we're seeking here is to have this court 
10 bring the matter which has been forwarded over to 
11 the court of appeals back to this court pursuant to 
12 the provisions of Rule 4AF. Under that rule, this 
13 court can review the court order and can bring the 
14 case back on jurisdictional matters. 
15 It's our position, Your Honor, that under 
16 7822 subparagraph 3(a), this court has jurisdiction 
17 over the judgments of the court of appeals. I 
18 think it's important that this --
19 THE COURT: What judgment of the court of 
20 appeals is involved? 
21 MR. WELLS: Well, Justice Zimmerman --
22 what has happened is not, in effect, a formal 
23 judgment. 
24 THE COURT: Well, then how can we have 
25 jurisdiction over it? 
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1 (Oral Argument) 
2 MR. WELLS: Well, it has the effect of a 
3 judgment. 
4 THE COURT: Because you failed to breach 
5 some things on appeal and waive them, but there's 
6 no final judgment been entered. 
7 MR. WELLS: Back to the question, the court 
8 has ruled later that, we failed to brief, 
9 and therefore waived. That is a judgment of the 
10 court, which it affects the whole class under Rule 
11 23 of the dismissal of class. 
12 THE COURT: Have they entered an order 
13 saying you've waived it? 
14 MR. WELLS: By refusing to allow the brief 
15 to be filed, the issue was not raised on the 
16 appeal. 
17 THE COURT: Did you raise it in your 
18 docketing statement? 
19 MR. WELLS: It was raised in the docket. 
20 THE COURT: You can argue it at oral 
21 argument presumably, can't you? 
22 MR. WELLS: Well, there's a question of 
23 J whether or not that is sufficient. It appears to 
us that through what we perceive to be a procedural 24 
25 mistake in the clerk's office, they have 
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1 (Oral Argument) 
2 misconstrued what occurred. 
3 What happened is that there was a 
4 breakdown on the computer at the office, which 
5 coincided, unfortunately, with the death of 
6 Mr. DeBry's father. The attorney was helping 
7 Mr. DeBry on a case, went to the court of appeals 
8 in an effort to comply with the deadline and said, 
9 "We need an additional extension because basically 
10 the brief is locked in the computer and we can't 
11 get it out. Now, to show good faith, that we are 
12 in fact working on the brief, we will file this 
13 preliminary draft,11 which was done. 
14 Then a letter was received back from the 
15 clerk's office saying that they had until the 24th 
16 of February to file the brief. The brief was in 
17 fact filed ahead of that with the motion to allow 
18 an oversized brief to be filed. Computer was then 
19 repaired, and we got the brief back. 
20 THE COURT: And the motion was denied, 
21 since presumably it was filed -- should have been 
22 filed earlier before you finished your brief, but 
23 that seems to be kind of local practice, to hope 
24 that we'll give you forgiveness and not 
25 permission. 
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1 (Oral Argument) 
2 MR. WELLS: Well, that's true. I think 
3 where the error occurred is that instead of 
4 allowing us to file a brief that was logged into 
5 the computer — lost in the computer, they required 
6 us to use as our brief the first draft that had 
7 been prepared long before that. 
8 Now, I can understand that, saying that 
9 you've got to file what was there on the day that 
10 you asked for the extension, but to prejudice the 
11 class by saying that because it was lost in the 
12 computer, and that as a good faith effort to show 
13 that you were moving forward in filing a previous 
14 addition that didn't have all the issues in it, 
15 you're now locked into those issues --
16 THE COURT: They haven't said that. You 
17 say that . 
18 MR. WELLS: The effect of what they have 
19 done says that. 
20 THE COURT: You still have oral argument. 
21 You had a docketing statement, so you can still 
22 argue it, which means that everything is presently 
23 sort of in coed down there. 
24 We don't know what's going to happen. 
25 Aren't you just up here doing the same thing you 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(Oral Argument) 
2 | tried to do about a month ago when you filed a 
3 I Mandamus petition against the court of appeals? 
4 MR. WELLS: Well, what we're trying to do 
5 now is to get this court to take it back and allow 
6 it to proceed expeditiously and on the basis it 
7 should have proceeded in the first place. 
8 That's basically what we're asking, is 
9 that this — it would be somewhat nebulous to allow 
10 the court of appeals to review its own judgment, 
11 and in effect sit in review of its own judgment as 
12 an appellate court reviewing itself. 
13 What we're asking this court to do in your 
14 position as the appellate court over the court of 
15 appeals, is to take a look at what's happened in 
16 this case — 
17 THE COURT: What is the judgment that they 
18 would be reviewing? 
19 MR. WELLS: You would be reviewing the 
20 refusal of the court to allow the brief to be 
21 filed. We can understand that if they deny an 
22 overlength brief, that's in their discretion. We 
23 have no problem with that. But we think once they 
24 do that they are, under fairness and due process 
25 consideration, required to give us at least a day 
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8 
(Oral Argument) 
or two to edit it down to the page requirement. 
THE COURT: Why? The rules provide that if 
you want to file an overlength brief, you can get 
permission in advance. If you ask for it the day 
you file the brief, you take the risk it will be 
thrown out. 
Local practioners seem to have the notion 
that they'll come up here and people will accept 
any old thing you can crank out, no matter how many 
pages, but the rules are very explicit. 
If you want an overlength brief, you can 
ask for permission before you write it, instead of 
waiting and not editing it and hoping that they'll 
just take whatever you get done with. 
It seems to me there isn't anything here 
except a refusal of them to grant you permission to 
file an overlength brief, which you want to 
appeal. 
MR. WELLS: Well, but what they did at that 
point was they then said, "Not only are we going to 
deny that to you, but we won't even allow you to 
file the actual brief that was in the computer on 
the date that it should have been filed." 
THE COURT: The rules require you to file 
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1 (Oral Argument) 
2 something physical, not whatever you happen to have 
3 in your head, on your computer, in the car, or in 
4 the mai1. 
5 MR. WELLS: Well, unfortunately, Your 
6 Honor, we live in a technical age. Sometimes 
7 something gets into a computer and it's physically 
8 impossible to get it out at a certain time. To say 
9 that, because of a computer breakdown, a whole 
10 class of defendants are now wiped out of this case, 
11 I think denies due process. 
12 THE COURT: It's not because of a computer 
13 breakdown. It's because you filed an overlength 
14 brief two weeks late. 
15 MR. WELLS: That wasn't the original 
16 problem, Your Honor. The original problem was that 
17 on the day that they filed this preliminary draft, 
18 the computer was broken. They could not get the 
19 current addition on that. So, in an effort to show 
20 good faith, they filed something. 
21 Now, to say that because of the computer 
22 breakdown, we can't get it out of the court of 
23 appeals, this class of defendants is just wiped out 
24 of the lawsuit, I think is a basic denial of due 
25 process Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 (Oral Argument) 
2 THE COURT: No, they're only saying because 
3 you filed an overlength brief which they chose not 
4 to accept, that you may have prejudiced your class 
5 -- your clients. That's true. 
6 MR. WELLS: That's true, but then to go 
7 back and say you can't file -- they ordered us to 
8 go back and file what we had on our tape. That was 
9 locked into the computer. What had been delivered 
10 was the preliminary draft. 
11 To say that you have to live with the 
12 preliminary draft, you can't even bring in what you 
13 have on that date because it was in the computer 
14 and we couldn't get it out; that's where I think 
15 the problem was. 
16 It isn't the exercise of the discretion 
17 denying the right to file an oversized brief. It's 
18 saying that you can't pull it out of the computer 
19 and file what you had on that date. You've got to 
20 file the preliminary draft, which was only given as 
21 an effort to show that we were, in fact, working on 
22 a brief at that point. 
23 And as you say, the court can't enter 
24 their lodging policy, lodge something that doesn't 
25 exist. But what we're saying is, that due to 
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(Oral Argument) 
consideration of the computer breakdown, that b a s 
due process should allow us tc at least take what 
we had on that date and file it. 
THE COURT: How long was it, do you know? 
MR. WELLS: I do not know, 'four Honor, 
THE COURT: Since it was in the computer . 
presumably it d i d n ? t have pages. 
MR. WELLS: Well, I don't know that ei the 
Your Honor. What I?m saying is that they should 
allowed to pull it cut and take it over there, an 
at least have the opportuni ty 
look back and then decide. 
have the c o u r ' 
THE COURT: Mr. Weils, about the authorit 
for this court to recall jurisdiction, you 
mentioned Rule 4AF, I believe. 
MR, WELLS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Dees that specifically provid 
for that procedure? 
MR. WELLS: That provides that the --
that's the provision that says the only basis on 
w h i c h this court can review a decision to 
(inaudible) over is on jurisdictional grounds. 
we're saying is, we want you to review 
that and basically say, "Ail right, we as an 
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(Oral Argument) 
appelate court will look at what's happened there, 
because we are the only court that can do 
aparo; .^  •»- a
 !
* '^  3 *• 
would be, I think, violating the statute that say-
a court can't review its own order. 
THE COURT: Well, this really isn't a 
jurisdictional problem, is it? 
MR. WELLS: Pardon me? 
. s rea-iiy is not a THE COURT: Th: 
jurisdictional problem. 
MR. WELLS: Well, it's jurisd. i o n a .1 m 
the sense that this court has the power to 
review — the jurisdictional power to review the 
judgments of the court of appeals. 
It would be our position that if the court 
of appeals is applying their internal rules in such 
a manner as to deny basic constitutional rights to 
litigants, that this court has a right to take a 
look at that and review them. 
THE COURT: Mr, Henricd? 
MR. HENRIOD: I'm Stephen Henriod and I 
represent the Respondent, Memorial Estates, The 
court has anticipated my argument, as indicated by 
the questions. It's the position of the 
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(Oral Argument ; 
respondents that this is not a jurisdictional 
matter, but rather a procedural one, that the court 
of ioneals properly enforced .^he rules regarding 
briefing schedule. 
We fd also like to point out to the court 
that the timing on this whole thing is somewhat 
suspect. 
The class issue which the plaintiff wants 
to make a lot out of was dismissed by a lower court 
between four and five years ago. The a p p e1a t e!s 
brief was due in December of 1333. It was over SO 
days in which this brief could and should have been 
filed, between the 30 day extention amd the ex 
parte extention and then the two motions for 
additional time. 
Clearly the substitute brief that was 
filed with the court was filed pursuant to the 
court of appealfs lodging policy. The very 
language included in the pleading, that they wanted 
to file a substitute brief and move on with the 
technical corrections that are allowed in the 
policy shows there's no explanation in the motion 
that a longer and a more detailed brief existed in 
the computer. 
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signing the pleadings in at least ove: a year. 
We will submit that this is a procedura1 
matter and will refer it back to the court of 
appeals where these very arguments appear and 
appelated reply to t h e m, and that they can exhaus 
these petitions. 
ir . Wells? 
A : - ^ : your r.or.or* j. would ^ ; 
note that in response to Justice Zimmerman's 
question about whether or not this is, in effect, a 
final judgment and affecting a class, I believe the 
court is correct in that if that does not happen, 
and if the court dees, in fact, allow those, then 
perhaps the due process questions disappear, 
3 u t I have a concern that counsel is going 
to argue to the court of appeals that that issue 
has in fact been waived. If they do that, then I 
believe the very problem that Z have suggested to 
the court, of the due process considerations to the 
class involved will then raise their head-. 
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( Oral Argument} 
Perhaps this is free choice, but Z do hav • 
that consideration because I've experienced that, 
where going to a court of appeals., it's been my 
experience that the on1y issues with which the 
court was generally familiar in argument are those 
raised in briefs. 
We've been basically precluded from 
raising the class issues in brief. That's where 
the concern arises, is that this could have an 
impact on the class. Perhaps this would be a due 
1 6 
13 
20 
o i 
orocess consicerat.ion 
l!?^ COURT: Thank y o u , g e n 11 e m e n . 
court will take the matter under advisemen 
(Concluded) 
9 K 
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1| March 12, 1990 Oral Argument 
2| (Electronically recorded) 
3 P R O C E E D I N G S 
4 THE COURT: Please proceed. 
5 MR. DeBRY: If it please the Court, Robert 
6 DeBry representing the appelant. 
7 In this case during the final briefing in 
8 February of 1989, about two weeks before the final 
9 brief was due my father passed away. Because of 
10 that I was with family matters, away from the 
11 office and out of action. 
12 We'd already received a couple of 
13 continuences, modest continuences because of 
14 illness and vacation schedules. So, with a death 
15 in the family we were trying to meet the final 
16 briefing schedule. 
17 On the due date of the brief, with a lot 
18 of scurrying around, we were ready to file, except 
19 that at the last minute the word processor broke 
20 down. Because of that quandary, we brought to this 
21 Court a preliminary draft brief that had been done 
22 and had been circulated around the office before 
23 the computer broke down, and we filed that brief 
24 with a motion for permission to file a substitute 
25 brief after we got the word processor repaired. 
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1 Our motion specifically stated the draft 
2 of the brief is not the current one -- that is the 
3 draft we left with the Court -- the current one is 
4 in the word processor memory. 
5 Later on there was some motions, and Judge 
6 Bench ruled that we were not permitted to file the 
7 brief which was finished, albeit in the computer 
8 memory and we were stuck with the original 30-page 
9 brief . 
10 Now, I'm not trying to reargue those 
11 earlier rulings, but I think since this is the 
12 hearing panel and you have to hear this on the 
13 merits, a word of explanation is in order as to why 
14 the brief you have in front of you is rather 
15 sketchy; the fact it was a partial preliminary 
16 draft brief, and by its very appearance is sketchy. 
17 Although we don't wish to reargue the 
18 earlier ruling by Judge Bench, we certainly would 
19 be available if the Court has some questions or 
20 some problems or if you require some additional 
21 assistance on any issue that's not clear from our 
22 sketchy brief. We'd certainly be available to file 
23 a supplemental brief if the Court requests that on 
24 any issues . 
25 THE COURT: The problem with that was that 
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you asked for an extension -- there was a 
misunderstanding -- you asked for an extension on 
filing the brief, but you didn't ask for permission 
to file an overlength brief, as I recall; is that 
correct? So, you did get the extension, but you 
didn't get permission to file the overlength brief 
under Judge Bench's ruling. 
MR. DeBRY: I think that's true, your 
Honor, and there certainly was a misunderstanding. 
Of course, our problem is, as I understand 
computers, we don't know how many pages -- you 
know, it's the last minute. There's been a 
funeral. We're cramming all in the computer. We 
didn't know how many pages were in the computer, so 
we couldn't really ask for the overlength brief 
until we got the computer fixed and it could spit 
it out, but it was a misunderstanding. 
THE COURT: Am I understanding correctly 
that a copy of the 79-page brief was appended to 
your motion asking leave to file an overlength 
brief? 
MR. DeBRY: No. 
THE COURT: So, that's nowhere in our 
record? 
MR. DeBRY: I don't think it's even here in 
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the courthouse. I think that was returned. When 
we filed for permission -- we filed the preliminary 
brief — made a motion to file a supplemental brief 
after the computer was fixed. 
What was with that was a 30-page brief, 
which was according to my recollection about a week 
old. It was a preliminary draft. The 79-page 
brief was in the computer. 
Turning to the merits, I would like to 
suggest, this is a summary judgment motion handled 
by Judge Moffat below; a reasonably complex case. 
I don't think any individual issue is terribly 
difficult, but I think there are a lot of issues. 
Reasonably class action and a reasonably complex 
case. About five or seven years old, as I recall, 
when Judge Moffat heard this. 
I suggest the heart of our argument is 
this. What colors everything in Judge Moffat's 
ruling, is that he didn't read the record. 
When the parties appeared for oral 
argument -- had the transcript of the oral argument 
-- Judge Moffat basically says, "Good morning," 
quote, "I haven't had a chance to look at the 
file." 
So, we have a judge who is ruling on a 
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1 fairly complex summary judgment motion with many 
2 contested fact issues, and what he says is, "I 
3 haven't read the file." 
4 THE COURT: Did he rule from the bench at 
5 that hearing? 
6 MR. DeBRY: Yeah, he ruled from the bench. 
7 What he had in his hand -- the only thing 
8 he had in his hand that he could look at is, as I 
9 recall a transcript, opposing counsel handed him a 
10 copy of the fifth amended complaint. 
11 Now, what follows is -- if I can 
12 characterize the hearing -- about the first half of 
13 the hearing we have defense counsel basically 
14 making proffers of proof, saying, "Judge this is my 
15 version of the facts." Then the second half we 
16 have the plaintiff's counsel sort of making 
17 proffers and saying, "Judge, well, this is my 
18 version of the facts." Then the judge without 
19 making any independent inquiry or looking at 
20 affidavits or any documents or depositions, rules 
21 from the bench. 
22 THE COURT: Let me just ask a question, 
23 Mr. DeBry. Maybe I misunderstood, but my notes on 
24 reading the briefs indicate that the judge 
25 dismissed the complaint as a sanction for failure 
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1 to respond to discovery. Is that incorrect? 
2 MR. DeBRY: That was one ground. 
3 THE COURT: Now, he wouldn't need to look 
4 at anything except the timeliness of your response 
5 to discovery in order to rule on that issue, would 
6 he? 
7 MR. DeBRY: I think that's partially right. 
8 I think there are three or four issues that were 
9 legal issues on which he could rule based on an 
10 oral argument. That's one of them. But I do think 
11 you have to look at something. Let me comment on 
12 that. 
13 THE COURT: Well, and the judgment itself 
14 is clear, that he premised it on the two distinct 
15 grounds. First of all, the default judgment will 
16 be entered for alleged failure to comply with the 
17 discovery schedule. 
18 Secondly — and assuming that he probably 
19 had it in the back of his mind that that wouldn't 
20 stick on appeal — secondly, also, summary judgment 
21 will be granted on the merits. 
22 So, I think he expressly articulated on 
23 both of those grounds. 
24 MR. DeBRY: That's right. I think it was 
25 the other way around. I think he said summary 
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1 judgment on the merits, and by the way, in case 
2 that doesn't stick as a discovery sanction -- a 
3 ruling on the discovery sanction. 
4 Now, to answer Judge Dillon's question, I 
5 think sort of he can rule on that as a matter of 
6 law, but the judge at that point has to exercise 
7 some discretion. Our reading of all the cases is 
8 that as a discovery sanction, yes, the judge can 
9 rule as a matter of law and dismiss the complaint, 
10 but as a matter of discretion he should inquire 
11 into whether or not anyone is prejudiced, and the 
12 circumstances of why the discovery was late. 
13 In this case the discovery -- our 
14 viewpoint is, and we told him at the brief -- was 
15 basically cumulative. It had all been done before. 
16 The case was five or six years old anyway. They 
17 had taken depositions of the parties. 
18 Our representation at the hearing was that 
19 although the mailing certificate was accurate, it 
20 appeared -- at least from our records -- we'd 
21 (inaudible) and found it in the office, and the 
22 judge didn't even look at the discovery; didn't 
23 even read the questions. It wasn't handed to him. 
24 The answers were filed that morning. He didn't 
25 look at the answers. So, he couldn't inquire into 
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1 whether anyone was prejudiced, nor could he 
2 inquire -- or balance the circumstances to apply 
3 his discretion. 
4 What he said at the end of the hearing 
5 was -- and his words were -- there's a Gardner 
6 case, Gardner versus Parkwest Village. The 
7 citation is in the briefing, but what the judge 
8 said at the end of the hearing was, "The Gardner 
9 case," quote, "requires dismissal," end quote. 
10 Now, I would suggest that that is error as 
11 a matter of law. The Gardner case, as well as all 
12 of the other cases on discovery sanctions say that 
13 the judge has discretion and he may exercise that 
14 discretion. He has a range of options, and one 
15 option is to dismiss. 
16 When he says the Gardner case requires 
17 dismissal, I think he's saying that he's not 
18 exercising his discretion, nor did he have anything 
19 to look at . 
20 THE COURT: Typically, locally at least, 
21 when a case is dismissed as discovery sanction, 
22 that's the second of a two-step process. 
23 First a party is ordered to answer by a 
24 date certain or appear for a deposition at a date 
25 certain. Only upon that failure is the ultimate 
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sanction issued. 
21 Do I understand correctly that that first 
3 step was omitted in this case? 
4 MR. DeBRY: Yes. There had never been a 
5 first step. There had never been a motion to --
6 THE COURT: There was a discovery cut-off 
7 date, but there was no order directed against you 
8 or your client — 
9 MR. DeBRY: That's right. 
10 THE COURT: -- to answer by a certain 
11 date? 
12 MR. DeBRY: That's right. 
13 THE COURT: Let me just, before you get 
14 into the merits, ask another kind of preliminary 
15 question that I was concerned about in reading the 
16 briefs. That was that you cite to a number of 
17 depositions in your statement of facts as to why 
18 they were material issues of fact that precluded 
19 summary judgment. Is it true that these 
20 depositions were never filed at the district court 
21 level, and therefore were not before Judge Moffat 
22 at the hearing? 
23 MR. DeBRY: Well, Ifm troubled by that as 
24 well. Let me represent to the Court that when we 
25 went to the Court -- back to the clerk of the 
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1 Court, my understanding is those -- that several of 
2 those had, in fact, been filed and been lost by the 
3 clerk of the Court. Our motion was to file a 
4 motion to supplement the record to get all those 
5 depositions in the record and be clear they're in 
6 the record. 
7 Then when I started thinking about it, I 
8 thought, wait a minute. It's true we had written 
9 the facts section and quoted from those briefs, but 
10 what should the appelate court be looking at? The 
11 reason we didn't do that is I suggest appelate 
12 court should be looking at what Judge Moffat had in 
13 his hand. The only thing that Judge Moffat had in 
14 his hand was the fifth amended complaint. Since he 
15 didn't look at the record, I don't think those 
16 depositions mattered. 
17 THE COURT: We could agree on that. 
18 MR. DeBRY: Now, to respond to Judge 
19 Billings' further point, there were a couple of 
20 other issues that I think were purely legal issues 
21 for which the Judge could rule from the bench. I 
22 can just tick those off, because I think they're 
23 reasonably well covered in the briefs, and I'll be 
24 happy to answer questions on those. 
25 One was there was a question about 
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1 dismissing a party who had died. The question is 
2 whether under the rule if someone dies there has to 
3 be a suggestion of death on the record, and 
4 there was a question whether or not there was a 
5 suggestion of death on the record. 
6 That is sort of a legal issue on which the 
7 judge might rule from the bench, but again, the 
8 judge didn't have anything in his hand except a 
9 fifth amended complaint. He didn't have in his 
10 hand the earlier pleading that defense counsel 
11 claimed was a suggestion of death. 
12 There's another issue that's legal that 
13 the Court could rule on, and that is whether 
14 Section 22-4-1 of the Utah Code would require the 
15 mortuary or the cemetary to keep 75 percent of the 
16 money in trust. 
17 Now, what happens is cemetaries go out and 
18 the sell pre-need funeral programs. So, they sell 
19 a burial plot or whatever for peace of mind, and 
20 maybe somebody dies in five or ten years, and the 
21 statute is to protect the public, so they have to 
22 keep that money in a trust. 
23 The question is whether that section 
24 applies to this case, and I think it is a legal 
25 issue, and I think it's fairly well covered by the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
1 briefs. 
2 Now, the last issue, and I'll touch on it 
3 quickly, is whether or not Judge Dee errored as a 
4 matter of law by dissolving the class. Originally 
5 Judge Fishier had certified the class. Later Judge 
6 Dee decertified the class. He uncertified the 
7 class . 
8 Although the briefs are sketchy, we do 
9 have in -- the Court did accept our appendix, and 
10 our appendix includes the findings of fact by Judge 
11 Dee, and the conclusions of law when he decertified 
12 it. I can just quickly say in my minute remaining, 
13 that Judge Dee, as a matter of law, he used the 
14 wrong legal rules when he decertified it. 
15 First of all he, on the numerosity 
16 question, one issue in a class action is whether 
17 the class is so numerous, et cetera. His test was 
18 in the Conclusion of Law No. 1, since the names and 
19 addresses of individuals signing the same form of 
20 contract are readily available, you can't have a 
21 class act ion• 
22 As a matter of law, that's the wrong test. 
23 That's part of the test. The test is much 
24 broader, and since I don't have time, the complete 
25 test is in a Utah Supreme Court case, Call versus 
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1 the City of West Jordan. 
2 Again, Judge Dee used the wrong test 
3 because he said that the plaintiffs, in his 
4 Conclusion of Law No. 3, had failed to prove that a 
5 class action is superior to other available 
6 methods. That's the wrong test because there are 
7 three alternative tests. 
8 If the Court will look at the rules, there 
9 are three alternatives. You can either qualify 
10 under 23-B-l or B-2 or B-3, and I don't have time, 
11 but he basically ruled as a matter of law you have 
12 to qualify under 23-B-3, and that's wrong. 
13 The last thing -- if I can -- I'm over, 
14 but if I can take 15 seconds -- that Judge Dee did 
15 wrong is there was a motion to enlarge the class, 
16 to make the class larger, and Judge Dee simply 
17 didn't hear that on the basis that he thought it 
18 had been ruled on before, and it hadn't. 
19 Now, I'm overtime, so I'll --
20 THE COURT: We'll give you a minute on 
21 rebuttal. 
22 MR. DeBRY: Thank you. 
23 MR. HENRIOD: May it please the Court, I'm 
24 Stephen Henroid. I represent the respondent, 
25 Memorial Estates. 
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I think some clarification of what went on 
in the lower court would be helpful in light of the 
appellant's argument. 
In December of 1987, the respondent filed 
a motion for summary judgment. That motion for 
summary judgment was argued in January of 1988. 
At that argument, Judge Moffat had 
completely reviewed the file; had discussed the 
case extensively with counsel for both the 
plaintiff and the defendant; and indicated that in 
his opinion the motion had merit, and indicated 
that he was prepared to rule on it to the detriment 
of the plaintiff. 
The response that the plaintiff made was 
to acknowlege that certain problems had arisen, 
primarily because this complaint was filed in 1982. 
The principal factual matter alleged in it 
is that the couple of mausoleums hadn't been 
constructed, and by the time this matter was being 
argued, both mausoleums had been constructed. 
So, counsel for the plaintiff said, "Let 
me address these issues by filing a new complaint." 
As counsel for the defendant, I stipulated that 
that was fine. The judge denied the motion without 
prejudice, and instructed the plaintiff that he had 
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1 20 days, I believe, to file a fifth amended 
2 complaint --
3 THE COURT: That is to say he denied the 
4 motion for summary judgment without prejudice? 
5 MR. HENRIOD: Yes, your Honor, not the 
6 motion to amend. 
7 Instructed the plaintiff to narrow the 
8 issues and cut out those items that were obviously 
9 no longer pertinent, and to refiie, and we set a 
10 schedule. 
11 What happened a month later was that the 
12 fifth amended complaint was filed with five totally 
13 new causes of action, with no deletions. All of 
14 the other causes remained in the matter, and at the 
15 same time the plaintiff asked for an expedited 
16 trial setting. 
17 The Court held a pre-trial, at which 
18 counsel for the plaintiff didn't appear and wasn't 
19 available by telephone, and had set a schedule. 
20 The schedule said that the trial would 
21 commence on July 6th; that the discovery cut-off 
22 was June 10th, and that the last day to file 
23 motions was June 16th, as I recall. 
24 The defendant filed a fourth set of 
25 interrogatories going into the new causes of 
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action, which were significant causes of action; 
one for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress and one based on the fact that the 
plaintiff claimed the mausoleum didn't look the way 
she thought it was going to look when she bought 
her contract. 
Those interrogatories were never answered. 
They weren't answered by the due date, which was 
June 1st, They weren't answered by the discovery 
cut-off, which was June 10th. 
No certificate of service of an answer has 
ever been filed in the case, although answers were 
hand-delivered at the hearing on the motion for 
summary judgment and for dismissal for failure to 
respond, pursuant to Rule 37, on June 21st, which 
was when the motion was heard. 
With trial only two weeks later, I believe 
that falls squarely within the parameters of the 
WWB Gardner case, in which there also was no 
two-step procedure, as referred to by Judge Orme. 
The reason was, with five brand new causes of 
action and no response to the discovery, the 
defendants were severely prejudiced, both in the 
motion for summary judgment argument, and would 
have been in the event of a trial. 
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1 Now, the Rule 37-B dismissal has not been 
2 appealed by the appellant in this matter. It is 
3 not addressed in either the appellant's brief or 
4 the reply brief, and stands. I believe that's all 
5 this Court needs to consider to resolve this 
6 matter. 
7 Our second principal point is -- has 
8 already been addressed by the Court, and that is 
9 that the only matters which were before the Court 
10 in response to the defendant's motion for summary 
11 judgment in the affidavits in support thereof, was 
12 the affidavit of Erma Schoney. 
13 Now, all of the affidavits had been filed 
14 before the Court heard the argument in January of 
15 1987. 
16 So, the fact that Judge Moffat, when he 
17 was hearing the argument later, hadn't made an 
18 extensive re-reading of the file and the 
19 affidavits, I do not believe in any way weakens the 
20 ruling and the basis upon which it was made. 
21 As a bottom line, the appellant simply 
22 failed to controvert the facts which were put into 
23 evidence by the defendant, which showed that there 
24 was no material issue of fact, and that the 
25 plaintiff wasn't going to be able to prevail upon 
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1 the evidence. 
2 Now, in filing their brief, they've quoted 
3 extensively from depositions which were never 
4 filed, and have not to this day been filed, and 
5 were not lost by the lower court. 
6 This morning, in checking the file before 
7 the hearing, to my surprise I found that a number 
8 of depositions have now been filed in this court 
9 that were filed in October of 1988. Our brief was 
10 filed in May of 1988. These are all unsigned 
11 copies, and I would assume that they come from the 
12 files of the appellant They were not in the lower 
13 court. They were not available to Judge Moffat. 
14 As this Court has ruled in the past — I'm 
15 quoting from the Shearer versus State, by and 
16 through Utah Department, found at 657 Pacific 2nd 
17 1337 -- where the moving party's evidentiary 
18 material is in itself sufficient, and the opposing 
19 party fails to proffer any evidentiary matter when 
20 he is presumably in a position to do so, the Court 
21 should be justified in concluding that no genuine 
22 issue of fact is present, nor would one be present 
2 3 at trial. 
24 Judge Moffat didn't have a burden to ask 
25 where the unfiled depositions were, and to get them 
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1 in front of him and review them. The plaintiff 
2 simply failed to (inaudible) burden on that issue 
3 in the lower court. 
4 Now, with respect to a couple of the 
5 issues that have been raised — 
6 THE COURT: Before you get to that, 
7 Mr. Henroid, tell me again -- walk me through your 
8 analysis as to why no appeal has properly been 
9 taken from the entry of default judgment at the 
10 discovery sanction. 
11 MR. HENRIOD: It's not raised in the 
12 appellan't docketing statement as an issue on 
13 appeal. It's not argued in the appellant's brief. 
14 It's something that the lower court did 
15 erroneously. It's not even referred to in the 
16 reply brief, which, as a matter of fact, replies 
17 to all kinds of things that weren't in the 
18 respondent's brief. That's my position. I've 
19 looked for it and I can't find it. 
20 THE COURT: It's not in the docketing 
21 statement, you say? 
22 MR. HENRIOD: It's not in the docketing 
23 statement either. 
24 Now, with respect to Judge Dee's 
25 decertification, I think the Court should note 
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1 about a year after the case was filed, Judge 
2 Fishier certified it as a class action under Rule 
3 23. He did that based upon the allegations 
4 contained in the plaintiff's complaint. They 
5 alleged sufficient members of the class. They 
6 alleged a certain identity of issues. They alleged 
7 that they could properly represent the group, and 
8 based on their allegations, the judge properly 
9 certified the case. 
10 Two years thereafter, when the motion to 
11 decertify was made, it was made on the basis of 
12 evidence. Judge Dee entered findings of fact. His 
13 findings of fact are in the record. The findings 
14 of fact specify that there are only 27 agreements 
15 containing the same terms; that the identity of 
16 all the parties entering into those agreements is 
17 known; that the -- well, the questions do not 
18 predominate over the group as a whole, because 
19 Schoney's questions involved for all evidence 
20 issues as to what occurred after they entered into 
21 the contract. 
22 It seems to me that the appellant's burden 
23 on that particular issue -- which is, of course, 
24 not part of the summary judgment or the Rule 37 
25 dismissal -- is to marshal the evidence in support 
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1 of Judge Dee's findings, and to show that there was 
2 clearly relevance. That has not been done. 
3 As a matter of fact, that also is not 
4 addressed, except for some conclusionary argument 
5 without citations to any authorities or any facts 
6 other than the record on the actual order of 
7 certification and the findings and conclusions 
8 regarding decertification. So, I think the 
9 appellant's argument has to fail on that as well. 
10 The motion to enlarge was considered by 
11 Judge Dee, and it is obviously so when you read his 
12 findings and conclusions. 
13 In the transcript which is quoted in the 
14 reply brief, he indicates that the points made in 
15 the motion to enlarge, were points that were 
16 already addressed in the second amended complaint, 
17 which was the complaint before the Court at that 
18 point in time. 
19 So, they weren't new, they weren't 
20 different, and they didn't form a basis for 
21 enlarging the class. 
22 THE COURT: Well, that motion was before 
23 him simultaneously with the motion to decertify? 
24 MR. HENRIOD: Yes, right, and he ruled on 
25 both of them. 
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1 THE COURT: I suspect that even if he 
2 hadn't explicitely ruled on the motion to enlarge, 
3 if you're decertifying a class, implicitely at 
4 least, you have determined not to enlarge it. 
5 MR. HENRIOD: I suppose. 
6 With respect to the matters that Counsel 
7 has indicated the Court could properly have 
8 addressed as a matter of law, the suggestion of 
9 death on the record very simply was a suggestion 
10 made in the motion for summary judgment which was 
11 filed in December of 1987, and there was no 
12 response ever filed to the suggestion of death on 
13 the record. Some 27 months had expired since the 
14 death of Mr. Schoney, and there was no substitution 
1 5 made . 
16 With respect to Section 22-4-1 that 
17 requires the 75-percent trust, that section in the 
18 form that it existed at the time the parties 
19 entered into the contract and completed their 
20 payments under the contract did not require the 
21 75-percent trust in connection with mausoleum 
22 crypts. In fact, the Schoneys paid off their 
23 contracts in 1977. This statute was amended in 
24 1983. Their money had all been paid before that 
25 time. 
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1 The amendment inserted, vaults, 
2 unconstructed mausoleum crypts, unconstructed 
3 niches and markers as substantive areas where the 
4 trust would apply; and deleted vaults, mausoleum 
5 crypts, niches, cemetary burial privileges. 
6 In their brief, the appellant argues that 
7 the amendment should relate back, as a mere 
8 clarification of the earlier statute. 
9 This was a significant substantive change 
10 in the statute. It wasn't a clarification. It 
11 shouldn't relate back. And lastly, both mausoleums 
12 had been constructed. 
13 So, any argument that the monies were not 
14 put in trust and therefore the appellant in this 
15 case was damaged, simply doesn't work. The 
16 mausoleums were constructed. The mausoleums have 
17 been in place. The plaintiff has not had any 
18 damage. Submit it. 
19 THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. DeBry, if you'd 
20 like to take another minute. 
21 MR. DeBRY: Appreciate it. Thank you, your 
2 2 Honor. 
23 Taking the last point first, what opposing 
24 Counsel, Mr. Henroid said about there's no damage. 
25 The mausoleums had been finished, that sounds a lot 
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like the transcript in front of Judge Dee. They're 
really arguing his version of facts. We just don't 
agree with those facts. 
The problem is, that's his version of the 
facts, and Judge Dee didn't have any -- or Judge 
Moffat didn't have anything to look at. We don't 
think judges should rule based on a proffer --
basically a proffer of somebody's version of the 
facts . 
Now, the other question is whether we 
appealed the ruling, the dismissal for discovery 
sanction. The answer to that is that at Exhibit I 
of the appendix prepared by the respondent, there 
is the judge's order — Judge Moffat's order, and 
he says in some detail, "Judgment should be entered 
upon the additional ground that the plaintiff has 
failed to respond to the defendant's fourth set of 
interrogatories." We specifically appealed from 
that order. 
Now, it may not be in the docketing 
statement, because I haven't looked at that for a 
while, but we certainly appealed from that order, 
and that is one of the issues that was in our brief 
that was locked in the computer that we would have 
presented to the Court in more detail if we had 
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1 been permitted to file that brief. Certainly it is 
2 clear error for a judge to say that if you're 15 
3 days late on discovery, that, quote, "requires 
4 dismissal." 
5 Finally, I think our basic argument is 
6 that Judge Moffat didn't have anything in front of 
7 him except verbal argument, and the Court shouldn't 
8 rule on summary judgment, especially in a 
9 complicated case based on oral argument. 
10 THE COURT: What about the suggestion, 
11 Mr. DeBry, that he had had all that stuff in front 
12 of him in January and been over it thoroughly at 
13 that point in time? 
14 MR. DeBRY: Well, that's a good question. 
15 THE COURT: I guess we're speculating about 
16 whether several months later — 
17 MR. DeBRY: And I want to comment on it. I 
18 just simply think that's a stretch. That's a long 
19 stretch, and it's basically a lot of speculation to 
20 say, "Well, he must have read it." Then that 
21 really gives a lot of -- every benefit of the doubt 
22 to say, "Well, if he didn't read it today or this 
23 week, he certainly must have read it." 
24 If it was that clear that the motion was 
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ll did they file three new affidavits with their 
2 motion — now, he didn't have that motion in his 
3 hand, he hadn't read it, and he hadn't read those 
4 affidavits, then they should have just asked for 
5 oral argument on the old motion. 
6 In fact, there were five new causes of 
7 action that had been pleaded. So, he certainly 
8 couldn't have read any of the fact issues or 
9 affidavits or interrogatories or depositions that 
10 relate to those five new fact issues. I'll be 
11 happy to answer questions, but I'm overtime now. 
12 THE COURT: Thank you very much, Mr. DeBry 
13 We'll take the matter under advisement 
14 (Adjourned) 
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STATE OF UTAH 
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
) ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
I, Beverly Lowe, a Notary Public in and 
for the State of Utah, do hereby certify: 
That the foregoing proceedings were 
transcribed under my direction from the electronic 
tape recording made of these proceedings. 
That this transcript is full, true and 
correct and contains all of the evidence, all of 
the objections of Counsel and rulings of the Court 
and all matters to which the same relate which were 
audible through the said tape recording. 
I further certify that I am not of kin or 
otherwise associated with any of the parties to 
said cause of action, and that I am not interested 
in the outcome thereof. 
That certain parties were not identified 
in the record, and therefore the name associated 
with the statement may not be the correct name as 
to the speaker. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this 30th day of 
August, 1990. 
My commission expires 
February 24, 1992 NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Utah County 
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